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WHY SETTLE FOR LESS? IMPROVING SETTLEMENT
CONFERENCES IN FEDERAL COURT
William P. Lynch*
Abstract: Most cases settle before trial. Recent studies show that approximately 1% of
cases filed in federal court go to trial. Alternative dispute resolution processes have been fully
incorporated into federal court, and settlement conferences have long been used by federal
court judges to control their dockets. Do they provide litigants with both substantive and
procedural justice in the vast majority of cases that do not proceed to trial? Lawyers have raised
concerns about judicial coercion to settle cases at settlement conferences, the loss of
confidentiality that occurs when parties raise claims of bad faith participation at the conference,
and that litigation over the level of participation at settlement conference threatens the premise
that settlement conferences help reduce court congestion.
This Article analyzes the dynamics of the settlement conference to show how common
intuitive biases and other factors may cause each of the participants—the parties, insurers,
lawyers, and judge—to incorrectly evaluate a case and whether it should settle. The Article
reviews recent studies of judicial reasoning and decisionmaking, case law and empirical studies
to reach several conclusions. The first is that trial judges should not hold a settlement
conference in their own cases. Second, courts should adopt an objective standard for assessing
good faith participation at a settlement conference. Third, courts should not award sanctions
against a party for failing to bargain sufficiently at a settlement conference or for failing to
have a representative present with full settlement authority. The Article concludes by
suggesting several procedural reforms, aimed at improving the actual and perceived fairness
of the proceeding.
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INTRODUCTION
Originally conceived as an alternative to litigation, alternative dispute
resolution (ADR) processes have been fully integrated into the federal
court system. ADR developed in the United States in several distinct
phases. Communities established neighborhood justice centers in the
1960s to allow parties to resolve their own disputes without court
intervention.1 In the 1970s and 1980s, states created screening panels and
arbitration of medical malpractice claims in an attempt to reduce the cost
of malpractice insurance, and the business community adopted mediation
and other ADR techniques to resolve claims more quickly. 2 In the 1980s
and 1990s, both state and federal courts incorporated ADR techniques into

1. William P. Lynch, Problems with Court-Annexed Mandatory Arbitration: Illustrations from the
New Mexico Experience, 32 N.M. L. REV. 181, 182 (2002).
2. Id.
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their court systems.3 While proponents of ADR claim a variety of benefits,
including increased flexibility in resolving issues and the possibility of
reconciliation between the parties, the primary motivation of court
incorporation of ADR has been to reduce court dockets.4
ADR attempts to assist the parties in reaching settlement by providing
them with unbiased information about possible trial outcomes that may
encourage them to reevaluate their positions and explore mutually
acceptable solutions. While a variety of ADR processes exist, this Article
focuses on mandatory settlement conferences in federal court.
Though much has been written over the years about the advantages and
disadvantages of court-annexed ADR,5 recent research on decisionmaking
and negotiation theory, case law, and empirical studies illustrates
significant concerns about settlement conferences in federal court. This
Article addresses three primary concerns about settlement conferences.
First, because judicial authority exerts pressure even in an informal
process such as a settlement conference, there is a danger that parties will
feel coerced to settle their cases, especially when the conference is held
by the trial judge. Second, when a party raises a claim of bad faith
participation at a settlement conference, that claim’s resolution can result
in a loss of confidentiality. Awareness of this risk (that the confidentiality
promised at the settlement conference may later be compromised) may
cause parties to bargain strategically at the conference and may affect their
perception of the fairness of the process. Third, litigation over the required
level of participation at settlement conferences has increased
significantly, and this litigation threatens to undercut the premise that
settlement conferences help resolve cases efficiently and reduce court
congestion.
Settlement conferences cannot be understood and evaluated in the
abstract. Part I of this Article briefly traces the development of judiciallyled settlement initiatives in civil cases in federal court, contrasting
settlement conferences with privately held mediations. Part II(A)
discusses empirical studies of whether parties who turned down a pre-trial
settlement offer improved their positions at trial. The studies show that
although plaintiffs make many more errors in rejecting settlement offers,
the cost of the defendants’ errors in rejecting plaintiffs’ offers is
significantly higher. Part II(B) reviews recent studies of decisionmaking
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. See, e.g., Wayne D. Brazil, Continuing the Conversation about the Current Status and the Future of
ADR: A View From the Courts, 2000 J. DISP. RESOL. 11 (2000) [hereinafter Brazil, Continuing the
Conversation] (discussing the variety of court-sponsored ADR programs and the danger that ADR will be
used to pressure parties to settle their cases to advance the court’s interest in reducing its case load).
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and negotiation theory and practice, and it points out psychological biases
and other common problems that may be encountered when evaluating a
case for settlement purposes. Many people make decisions based on
intuition, and though intuition can be surprisingly accurate, it is not well
suited to the resolution of complex disputes with multiple actors and
sophisticated rules. Part II(C) examines the dynamics of the settlement
conference from the perspectives of the participants—the parties, insurers,
lawyers, and the judge—and shows how intuitive biases and other factors
unique to each participant might cause them to incorrectly assess the value
of the case and whether it should settle.
There can be distinct advantages to a settlement conference conducted
by a judge, and Part III reviews those advantages. Part IV evaluates the
risks to the parties and to the court of settlement conferences. Part IV(A)
discusses the pressure the parties may feel to settle the case when the
conference is conducted not by a disinterested neutral, but by a judge who
has decisionmaking authority in that case or a future case. Part IV(B)
examines how requiring judges to evaluate whether a party participated in
good faith undercuts the confidentiality that is essential to the integrity of
the settlement conference. Part IV(C) demonstrates how the increase in
satellite litigation over the parties’ level of participation at the conference
endangers the primary purpose of settlement conferences—reducing court
congestion.
Part V proposes several recommendations to improve federal court
settlement conferences. First, Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure should be amended to (1) preclude trial judges from conducting
settlement conferences in their own cases and (2) bar the pretrial judge
from ruling on dispositive motions after holding an unsuccessful
settlement conference. Second, Rule 16’s good faith participation
requirement should be assessed using an objective standard, and courts
should not order parties to attend a settlement conference with “full
settlement authority.” Finally, federal district courts should adopt certain
procedural safeguards to ensure that the settlement conference process is
fair to all parties. These safeguards include adopting local ADR rules that
provide for the confidentiality of information discussed at the settlement
conference. Confidentiality allows the parties to raise sensitive issues with
the judge, contributes to the free flow of information between the parties,
protects the neutrality of the judge, and ensures that the parties perceive
that the settlement conference is procedurally fair. Because only a small
percentage of cases go to trial, making these changes will have a profound
impact on the parties’ perceptions of fairness in the much greater
percentage of cases that settle before trial.
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SETTLEMENT CONFERENCES IN FEDERAL COURT

Trials are important for at least two reasons. First, they directly affect
the participants: they resolve the dispute between the parties in the case.6
Second, and more importantly, they impact a wider audience: trial verdicts
establish benchmarks for the settlement of the vast majority of cases that
do not proceed to trial.7 The far-reaching impact of a trial may deter future
actors or serve as precedent for future decisionmakers.8 As Samuel Gross
and Kent Syverud stated, “trials cast a major part of the legal shadow
within which private bargaining takes place.”9 In bargaining in the shadow
of the law, “litigants order their private, out-of-court negotiations around
the substantive law and procedure that will be applied if the negotiations
break down and the court steps out of the shadows to adjudicate the
dispute.”10
But the reality of the civil justice system is that most cases settle. In
fact, remarkably few civil cases in federal court are actually decided by a
jury. In his landmark study, Marc Galanter documented the steep decline
in both the percentage and the number of civil trials in federal court over
the years.11 The percentage of federal civil cases resolved by trial fell from
11.5% in 1962 to 1.8% in 2002.12 In addition, the actual number of civil
jury trials decreased by more than 20%, from 5,802 to 4,569 over the same
time period.13 More recent studies suggest that the percentage of civil
cases resolved by trial has fallen even further, to approximately 1%.14
When too many cases settle, the parties are deprived of the supply of

6. Marc Galanter & Mia Cahill, “Most Cases Settle”: Judicial Promotion and Regulation of
Settlements, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1339, 1378–79 (1994).
7. Samuel R. Gross & Kent D. Syverud, Don’t Try: Civil Jury Verdicts in a System Geared to
Settlement, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1, 4 (1996) [hereinafter Gross & Syverud, Don’t Try]; see Galanter &
Cahill, supra note 6, at 1379.
8. Galanter & Cahill, supra note 6, at 1379.
9. Gross & Syverud, Don’t Try, supra note 7, at 4.
10. Samuel R. Gross & Kent D. Syverud, Getting to No: A Study of Settlement Negotiation and the
Selection of Cases for Trial, 90 MICH. L. REV. 319, 327 (1991) [hereinafter Gross & Syverud, Getting
to No].
11. Marc Galanter, The Vanishing Trial: An Examination of Trials and Related Matters in Federal
and State Courts, 1 J. EMP. L. STUD. 459, 460–61 (2004).
12. Id. at 461.
13. Id. This decline cannot be attributed to an increase in criminal jury trials: the percentage of
criminal dispositions by trial fell from 15% in 1962 to under 5% in 2002, while the total number of
criminal trials decreased from 5,097 to 3,574, a drop of 30%. Id. at 492–93.
14. J. Maria Glover, The Federal Rules of Civil Settlement, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1713, 1720 n.21
(2012).
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precedent that sets the framework for their private negotiations.15
A.

The Development of Settlement Conferences in Federal Court

The inaugural version of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, adopted
in 1938, did not mention judicial promotion of or involvement in
settlement discussions.16 The dominant view at that time was that
settlement was a by-product of good pre-trial procedure and judicial case
management, not a primary purpose to be actively pursued by the judge.17
Beginning in the 1970s, however, as judges shifted from being merely
neutral adjudicators to “managerial judges” whose main task is to manage
legal dockets and reduce the costs of adjudication, judges began to view
participation in settlement negotiations as an essential part of controlling
their dockets.18 Rule 16 was amended in 1983 to specifically authorize
judges to discuss settlement of the case at the pretrial conference.19
Indeed, the Advisory Committee acknowledged that the 1983
amendments regarding settlement conformed the rule to existing practice
because “it has become commonplace to discuss settlement at pretrial
conferences.”20
Federal courts have continued to play a significant role in settlement
negotiations during the modern era. The Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990
(CJRA) required district courts to consider six case management
principles to reduce expense and delay in the courts, including referring
cases to ADR, and many districts included some form of ADR in their
plan.21 After considering the experience of district courts with
experimental ADR programs in federal court, Congress enacted the
Alternative Dispute Resolution Act (ADRA) of 1998.22 The ADRA
mandated that every federal district court establish an ADR program and

15. Id. at 1743; RANDALL KISER, BEYOND RIGHT AND WRONG: THE POWER OF EFFECTIVE
DECISION MAKING FOR ATTORNEYS AND CLIENTS 189–90 [hereinafter KISER, BEYOND RIGHT AND
WRONG]; Galanter & Cahill, supra note 6, at 1385.
16. Ellen E. Deason, Beyond “Managerial Judges”: Appropriate Roles in Settlement, 78 OHIO ST.
L.J. 73, 79–80 (2017).
17. Id. at 81; Nancy A. Welsh, Magistrate Judges, Settlement, and Procedural Justice, 16 NEV.
L.J. 983, 1004 (2016).
18. Deason, supra note 16, at 85–86.
19. FED. R. CIV. P. 16 advisory committee’s note to 1983 amendment.
20. Id.
21. Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, Pub. L No, 101-650, 104 Stat. 5089–98 (codified at 28 U.S.C.
§ 471–82 (1994)); Deason, supra note 16, at 91.
22. Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-315, 112 Stat. 2993 (codified at
28 U.S.C. §§ 651–58 (1998)).
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authorized federal courts to compel parties to participate in ADR.23 While
there are a variety of ADR processes, mediation is the most common
court-connected process, authorized by two-thirds of the ninety-four
federal district courts.24 As of 2011, ten federal district courts designated
settlement conferences as the sole type of ADR process authorized by
their local rule, although judges in other districts conduct settlement
conferences as part of or in addition to the ADR processes offered in their
district.25 For the twelve-month periods ending September 30, 2017 and
September 30, 2018, magistrate judges conducted 21,258 and 21,185
settlement conferences/mediations respectively.26
Courts have incorporated ADR with the hope of settling cases short of
trial.27 As with much of life, settlement of cases implicates two, apparently
conflicting premises. On one hand, judges must manage their caseloads
efficiently to deal with growing dockets and to control costs.28 On the
other hand, most civil litigants have a Seventh Amendment right to jury
trial.29 While public policy favors the private resolution of disputes
without court involvement, the parties should not feel pressured to settle
their cases to satisfy the court’s interest in reducing its caseload.30
23.
24.
25.
26.

28 U.S.C. § 652(a) (1998).
DONNA STIENSTRA, ADR IN THE FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS: AN INITIAL REPORT 5 (2011).
Id. at 5, 13; Deason, supra note 16, at 92.
See ADMIN. OFF. OF THE COURTS, TABLE S-17, MATTERS DISPOSED OF BY U.S. MAGISTRATE
JUDGES FOR THE 10-YEAR PERIOD ENDED SEPTEMBER 30, 2018
(2018),
https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/data_tables/jb_s17_0930.2018.pdf
[https://perma.cc/R7ET-SGLJ]. The Administrative Office of the Courts does not report the number
of settlement conferences conducted by district judges. See ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE COURTS, TABLE
T-8, U.S. DISTRICT COURTS—TRIAL HOURS AND ACTIVITY, BY DISTRICT, DURING THE 12-MONTH
PERIOD ENDING DECEMBER 31 (2018) (on file with author).
27. James J. Alfini & Catherine G. McCabe, Mediating in the Shadow of the Courts: A Survey of
the Emerging Case Law, 54 ARK. L. REV. 171, 173–74 (2001) (“Court-sponsored mandatory
mediation programs generally are promoted and established, however, for reasons of judicial
economy, with little attention given to mediation’s core values.”); Edward F. Sherman, CourtMandated Alternative Dispute Resolution: What Form of Participation Should be Required?, 46 SMU
L. REV. 2079, 2081 (1993) (“The primary motivation of court rules and orders incorporating ADR
has clearly been the hope of achieving settlement short of trial.”).
28. Galanter, supra note 11, at 485 (2004) (stating how filings in federal court increased fivefold
from 1962–2002).
29. U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
30. Kothe v. Smith, 771 F.2d 667, 669 (2d Cir. 1985). Several commentators have questioned
whether court-annexed ADR is effective in producing more settlements or making courts more
productive. See Galanter & Cahill, supra note 6, at 1370 (“The limited efficacy of judicial promotion
of settlement is not surprising if we recall that most cases would settle anyway.”); Gross & Syverud,
Don’t Try, supra note 7, at 60 (“Information-based techniques includ[ing] judicially supervised
settlement conferences . . . are unlikely to succeed in squeezing out many more trials.”); Richard A.
Posner, The Summary Jury Trial and Other Methods of Alternative Dispute Resolution: Some
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The Differences Between Settlement Conferences and Mediations

There are two primary models of settlement conferences in federal
court. In the first, one of the judges assigned to the case, either the trial
judge or the judge who handles pretrial matters, conducts the settlement
conference.31 In the second model, the settlement conference is held by a
judge who is not assigned to the case.32
Judges have great discretion in how they conduct a settlement
conference.33 Settlement conferences are held off the record, and many
judges hold a joint initial session with all parties before beginning separate
ex parte conferences with each side.34 At the settlement conference,
judges may use methods associated with facilitative mediation, in which
a mediator does not express to the parties an analysis or evaluation of the
case and helps the parties find their own resolution to the dispute.35
However, they also may use traditional evaluative techniques and attempt
to push the parties towards settlement.36 This behavior can cause
confusion for the parties because it blurs the lines between settlement
conferences and mediations.37
Cautionary Observations, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 366, 382 (1986) [hereinafter Posner, The Summary Jury
Trial and Other Methods of Alternative Dispute Resolution] (“To summarize, the study does not
support a conclusion that the summary jury trial increases judicial efficiency.”). Others have noted
that cases that once might have been settled by direct negotiation between counsel are now settled
through court-annexed ADR, which is more expensive than negotiation and may delay resolution of
the case. RANDALL KISER, HOW LEADING LAWYERS THINK: EXPERT INSIGHTS INTO JUDGMENT AND
ADVOCACY 189–91 (Anke Seyfried ed., Springer 2011); Galanter & Cahill, supra note 6, at 1364–
65, 1371. These issues are beyond the scope of this Article.
31. Roselle L. Wissler, Court-Connected Settlement Procedures: Mediation and Judicial
Settlement Conferences, 26 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 271, 272–73 (2011); Deason, supra note 17,
at 137. The trial judge may be a district judge or a magistrate judge if the parties have consented to a
magistrate judge holding the trial. 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1) (2012).
32. Wissler, supra note 31, at 272–73.
33. Michael Alberstein, Judicial Conflict Resolution (JCR): A New Jurisprudence for an Emerging
Judicial Practice, 16 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 879, 905 (2015) (“[M]ost of the judicial conflict
resolution activities of judges are unregulated and mostly unconscious.”); Jeffrey A. Parness,
Improving Judicial Settlement Conferences, 39 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1891, 1891–92 (2006) (“[F]ar too
often [judicial settlement conferences are] undertaken with unbounded, unbridled, and virtually
unfettered trial court discretion.”).
34. John C. Cratsley, Judicial Ethics and Judicial Settlement Practices: Time for Two Strangers to
Meet, 21 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 569, 573–74 (2006). The Code of Judicial Conduct allows
judges, with the consent of the parties, to engage in ex parte communications with parties when
discussing settlement. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT FOR U.S. JUDGES Canon 3(A)(4) (ADMIN. OFFICE
OF THE COURTS 2014).
35. Deason, supra note 16, at 97–105; Brazil, Continuing the Conversation, supra note 5, at 32
(“[A] facilitative mediator is never to form or express normative or analytical critiques.”).
36. Deason, supra note 16, at 97–105; Brazil, Continuing the Conversation, supra note 5, at 32.
37. Welsh, supra note 17, at 1018 (“But in practice, it can be difficult to discern a bright line
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Mediation envisions a different paradigm for dispute resolution than
that provided by the court system. Mediation is a private, confidential
process in which an experienced neutral facilitates communication
between the parties to help them find their own solution to their dispute.38
Mediation offers the possibility of innovative results that may not be
available through the court system because assisted dialogue between the
parties may lead to collaboration, creativity, and cooperation as they
search for mutually beneficial solutions to their dispute.39 A mediator can
help the parties communicate; share their perspectives and analyses;
identify their underlying interests, needs and priorities; repair damaged
relationships; and search for common ground.40 The core values of the
mediation process are party self-determination, mediator neutrality, and
confidentiality.41 The parties decide the timing of the mediation, the issues
to be discussed, and who will attend.42 In facilitative mediation, the
neutral mediator refrains from evaluating the case and giving an opinion
on the best way to resolve it, and information flows from the parties to the
neutral.43 If a settlement is not reached, the parties and the mediator are
bound to keep all mediation communications confidential.44
While a settlement conference may be similar to a mediation in some
ways, there are important differences between them. First, settlement
distinction between judicial settlement sessions and mediation.”); Deason, supra note 16, at 102 (“[I]t
is difficult to separate judges’ behaviors in court settlement conferences from those of private
mediators.”).
38. Kimberlee K. Kovach, The Mediation Coma: Purposeful or Problematic, 16 CARDOZO J.
CONFLICT RESOL. 755, 773 (2015) [hereinafter Kovach, Mediation Coma]; Peter N. Thompson, Good
Faith Mediation in the Federal Courts, 26 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 363, 364 (2011).
39. Kovach, Mediation Coma, supra note 38, at 762; Kimberlee K. Kovach, New Wine Requires
New Wineskins: Transforming Lawyer Ethics for Effective Representation in a Non-Adversarial
Approach to Problem Solving: Mediation, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 935, 947 (2001).
40. Wayne D. Brazil, Hosting Mediations as a Representative of the System of Civil Justice, 22
OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 227, 249 (2007) [hereinafter Brazil, Hosting Mediations].
41. Kovach, Mediation Coma, supra note 38, at 773–75; ABA SEC. DISPUTE RESOLUTION,
RESOLUTION ON GOOD FAITH REQUIREMENTS FOR MEDIATORS AND MEDIATION ADVOCATES IN
COURT-MANDATED
MEDIATION
PROGRAMS
(2004), www.abanet.org/dispute/draft2.doc
[https://perma.cc/MTB9-B3T3].
42. Kovach, Mediation Coma, supra note 38, at 773; Brazil, Hosting Mediations, supra note 40, at
237–38; Michael P. Dickey, ADR Gone Wild: Is it Time for a Federal Mediation Exclusionary Rule?,
25 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 713, 717 (2010).
43. Kimberlee K. Kovach, Good Faith in Mediation—Requested, Recommended, or Required? A
New Ethic, 38 S. TEX. L. REV. 575, 583 (1997) [hereinafter Kovach, Good Faith]; Leonard L. Riskin,
Understanding Mediators’ Orientations, Strategies and Techniques: A Grid for the Perplexed, 1
HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 7, 22–24 (1996).
44. See, e.g., UNIFORM MEDIATION ACT §§ 4–6 (amended 2003) (explaining the evidentiary
privilege that protects the confidentiality of mediation disclosures, waiver and preclusion of the
privilege, and exceptions to the privilege).
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conferences have always unambiguously sought settlement of cases,
while mediation has been more focused on assisting communication
between the parties and maintaining party control of settlement
decisions.45 Second, a settlement conference is not conducted by a private
mediator hired by the parties, but by a federal district or magistrate judge
who may have to rule on substantive or procedural motions if the
conference is unsuccessful.46 Third, the parties may be ordered to attend
a settlement conference even if they have indicated they have no interest
in discussing settlement.47 Fourth, courts often order parties to appear at
the conference with “full settlement authority,”48 which may mean
different things to the parties and the court. Fifth, the court can issue
sanctions if a party or its attorney “is substantially unprepared to
participate—or does not participate in good faith—in the conference.”49
Sixth, while a judge may use a facilitative approach, many judges use
evaluative techniques to analyze the case and may push the parties hard
to settle the case, and information often flows from the judge to the
parties.50 Finally, confidentiality is not guaranteed to the participants: the
federal districts have widely varying rules concerning confidentiality at
settlement conferences.51
As most cases settle before trial, a settlement conference may be a
party’s “day in court,” and consequently it is imperative that the
settlement conference process provide both substantive and procedural
fairness to the parties. This Article will examine some of the ways the
current settlement conference process in federal court falls short of the
mark and how settlement conferences may be improved to ensure they are
of high quality, meet standards of fair procedure, and provide a beneficial
outcome for the parties.

45. SARAH R. COLE, CRAIG A. MCEWAN, NANCY H. ROGERS, JAMES R. COBEN, PETER N.
THOMPSON, MEDIATION: LAW, POLICY AND PRACTICE, § 1:1 (2d ed. 2016); Dickey, supra note 42,
at 719. There can be benefits to the parties even if a case does not settle at a settlement conference.
Lawyers and litigants often use ADR to further their understanding of the strengths and weaknesses
of the case, the opposing parties and lawyers, which makes them better prepared for trial. Brazil,
Hosting Mediations, supra note 40, at 232, 245 n.29; E-mail from Kari Cole to William Lynch (Oct.
31, 2018, 19:04) (on file with author).
46. See supra note *.
47. FED. R. CIV. P. 16(a)(5) & (c)(1).
48. See supra note *.
49. FED. R. CIV. P. 16(f)(1)(B).
50. Deason, supra note 16, at 102–04; Campbell Killefer, Wrestling with the Judge Who Wants You
to Settle, 35 LITIG. 17, 17 (2009); Steven J. Miller, Judicial Mediation: Two Judges’ Philosophies,
38 LITIG. 31, 37 (2012).
51. Dickey, supra note 42, at 732–35.
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EVALUATING A CASE FOR SETTLEMENT

Assessing the settlement value of a case is a subjective process. There
is no scientific process for evaluating factors intrinsic to any particular
case. Further, each case has the possibility of variable outcomes based on
factors extrinsic to the case, and “lawyers, judges and juries may produce
very different results in the same case.”52 Therefore, there is not “one
correct number for a settlement, but there are a range of numbers in which
a settlement can be perceived as fair.”53 Moreover, there is uncertainty in
any negotiation. “It’s not often that you can foretell success or failure
clearly at the beginning of a negotiation process.”54
A.

Studies of Settlement Decisions

Several empirical studies over the past twenty years have examined
whether parties in civil cases erred by rejecting a settlement offer and
proceeding to trial where they received a verdict that was less beneficial
than the settlement offer.55 In evaluating this issue, the researchers
constructed three categories: (1) the plaintiff made a decision error if the
judgment was less than the final settlement offer made by the defendant;
(2) the defendant made a decision error if the judgment exceeded the final
settlement offer by the plaintiff; and (3) there was no decision error when
the judgment fell between the final two settlement offers.56 Although the
52. Galanter & Cahill, supra note 6, at 1347; see also KISER, BEYOND RIGHT AND WRONG, supra
note 15, at 20; Gross & Syverud, Don’t Try, supra note 7, at 37; Richard Birke & Craig R. Fox,
Psychological Principles in Negotiating Civil Settlements, 4 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 1, 13, 13 n.54
(1999).
53. Morton Denlow, Settlement Conference Techniques: Caucus Dos and Don’ts, 49 JUDGES J. 21,
24–25 (2010).
54. Deepak Malhotra, I’m an Expert on Negotiations, and I Have Some Advice for Theresa May,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 20, 2018 https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/20/opinion/brexit-theresa-maynegotiations.html [https://perma.cc/JG6R-NFZC]. As Niels Bohr, the physicist and Nobel Prize
winner, put it, “[p]rediction is very difficult, especially about the future.” JENNIFER K. ROBBENNOLT
& JEAN R. STERNLIGHT, PSYCHOLOGY FOR LAWYERS: UNDERSTANDING THE HUMAN FACTORS IN
NEGOTIATION, LITIGATION AND DECISION MAKING 68 (2012).
55. KISER, BEYOND RIGHT AND WRONG, supra note 15, at 31–85; Gross & Syverud, Don’t Try,
supra note 7, at 41–42; Randall L. Kiser, Martin A. Asher & Blakely B. McShane, Let’s Not Make a
Deal: An Empirical Study of Decision Making in Unsuccessful Settlement Negotiations, 5 J.
EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 551, 556–67 (2008) [hereinafter Kiser et al., Let’s Not Make a Deal]; Jeffrey
J. Rachlinski, Gains, Losses, and the Psychology of Litigation, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 113, 152–60 (1996).
56. KISER, BEYOND RIGHT AND WRONG, supra note 15, at 37; Gross & Syverud, Don’t Try, supra
note 7, at 41–42; Kiser et al., Let’s Not Make a Deal, supra note 55, at 563; Rachlinski, supra note
55, at 152–53. These categories may underreport decision errors because even if a verdict is an
improvement on the other party’s final offer, the costs and attorney’s fees incurred in going to trial
may exceed the gains in the verdict. Gross & Syverud, Don’t Try, supra note 7, at 43–44.
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results of the studies are not identical, they are consistent: plaintiffs make
many more decision errors, but the costs of the defendants’ errors are
significantly higher. Plaintiffs made decision errors in 56.1% to 65% of
the cases studied, while the defendants made errors in 23% to 25% of the
cases.57 One study published in 1996 found that the average cost of a
plaintiff’s error was $27,687 per case, while the average cost of a defense
error was $354,949 per case.58 Twelve years later, another study also
found a substantial difference in the mean cost of error between plaintiffs
and defendants: $43,100 for plaintiffs and $1,140,000 for defendants.59
Randall Kiser and his co-authors examined whether decision error rates
were related to certain types of cases and forums.60 They found that
plaintiffs had higher error rates in cases in which contingency fee
arrangements are common (i.e., personal injury and medical malpractice)
and lower error rates in cases in which contingency fee arrangements are
not common (i.e., contracts and eminent domain).61 Conversely, the
defendants had higher error rates in cases where insurance coverage is not
generally available (i.e., contracts and fraud) and lower error rates in cases
where insurance coverage is generally available (i.e., premises liability
and personal injury).62 They also found remarkably different error rates
when comparing bench and jury trials. The plaintiffs’ error rates were
considerably higher in jury trials, while defendants committed
substantially less decision error in jury trials relative to bench trials.63
B.

Studies of Decisionmaking and Negotiation

Settlement conferences cannot be evaluated in isolation. They are part
of a larger negotiation process by which the parties attempt to resolve the
case. Recent studies of decisionmaking and negotiation theory and
practice help us understand the dynamics of negotiations at a settlement
conference. These studies explain why parties, insurers, lawyers, and
judges may reach different conclusions about the value of a case and
whether it should settle. The studies also provide insight into possible

57. Gross & Syverud, Don’t Try, supra note 7, at 42; Rachlinski, supra note 55, at 154; Kiser et
al., Let’s Not Make a Deal, supra note 55, at 566; KISER, BEYOND RIGHT AND WRONG, supra note
15, at 42–45.
58. Rachlinski, supra note 55, at 154.
59. Kiser et al., Let’s Not Make a Deal, supra note 55, at 566.
60. Id. at 552–54.
61. Id. at 577–78.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 579–81.
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improvements to the settlement conference process.
1.

Decisionmaking

There are many theories concerning how people make decisions under
conditions of uncertainty. Researchers began extensive study of human
judgment and decisionmaking in the 1920s.64 Economists who were trying
to determine how people make good decisions conducted research
providing the building blocks for an early model of decisionmaking.65
This model studied game theory, expected utility theory, litigation risk
analysis, the Coase Theorem, and the prisoner’s dilemma, among other
matters, to predict how decisions would be made.66 This model of
decisionmaking—the law and economics model—assumes that parties are
generally rational and will consistently make decisions in litigation that
maximize their economic interests.67
Research by cognitive psychologists and behavioral economists has
demonstrated that the law and economics model is incomplete and must
be supplemented with insights into the psychological barriers to the
rational resolution of disputes.68 As those researchers have shown, people
routinely make choices that do not maximize their economic interests. In
doing so, they make decisions using either deliberative processes,
intuitive processes, or a combination of the two.69 Deliberative processes
are mental operations requiring effort, motivation, concentration, and the
execution of learned rules.70 Intuitive processes, on the other hand, occur
automatically, do not require or consume much attention, and are

64. KISER, BEYOND RIGHT AND WRONG, supra note 15, at 108–10.
65. Richard Birke, Neuroscience and Settlement: An Examination of Scientific Innovations and
Practical Applications, 25 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 477, 485–87 (2010).
66. Id. at 486–90.
67. Birke, supra note 65, at 486; see generally DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW 8
(2011); Chris Guthrie & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Insurers, Illusions of Judgment & Litigation, 59 VAND.
L. REV. 2017, 2018–19 (2006) [hereinafter Guthrie & Rachlinski, Insurers].
68. KISER, BEYOND RIGHT AND WRONG, supra note 15, at 89–90; Birke, supra note 65, at 490–
91; Birke & Fox, supra note 52, at 2; Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral
Science: Removing the Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1051,
1075–76 (2000).
69. PAUL BREST & LINDA HAMILTON KRIEGER, PROBLEM SOLVING, DECISION MAKING, AND
PROFESSIONAL JUDGMENT 22 (2010) (“Problem solving and decision making in professional contexts
and in everyday life calls for a mixture of intuition and deliberation—of System 1 and System 2
processes.”); Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Andrew Wistrich, Blinking on the Bench: How
Judges Decide Cases, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 6–10 (2007) [hereinafter Guthrie et al., Blinking].
70. KAHNEMAN, supra note 67, at 20–21; Guthrie et al., Blinking, supra note 69, at 7–8.
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effortless and fast.71 Although intuition can be surprisingly accurate, it is
often not well-suited to complex disputes that have multiple actors and
intricate rules, and good judgment sometimes requires verifying or
eliminating intuition’s influence on the deliberative process.72
There are many intuitive biases73 that may produce errors when people
make decisions.74 Perhaps the most significant cause of decisionmaking
failure is optimistic overconfidence, in which people underestimate the
risks they face, exaggerate their own capabilities, and fail to allow
sufficiently for uncertainty in their judgments.75 Other biases include:
▪ Confirmation bias: People look for information that buttresses
their preexisting conclusions and disregard conflicting
information, instead of attempting to systematically gather
accurate information;76
▪ Anchoring: People get stuck on available numbers that do not
necessarily provide relevant information when making a
decision and then fail to adjust sufficiently away from the
anchor;77
▪ Framing: Different ways of presenting identical information to
people often triggers different decisions; people are riskavoiding in the face of gains but risk-seeking in the face of
losses;78
▪ Hindsight bias: Information about what occurred tends to
influence people’s judgments about what they thought would
71. KAHNEMAN, supra note 67, at 20–21; Guthrie et al., Blinking, supra note 69, at 7.
72. KISER, BEYOND RIGHT AND WRONG, supra note 15, at 89; Guthrie et al., Blinking, supra note 69, at 8.
73. KAHNEMAN, supra note 67, at 3 (“Systematic errors [that people make] are known as biases,
and they recur predictably in particular circumstances.”). Intuitive biases are also sometimes referred
to as cognitive heuristics and can be considered mental shortcuts or rules of thumb. Id. at 4.
74. KISER, BEYOND RIGHT AND WRONG, supra note 15, at 90 (“Cognitive psychologists and
behavioral economists have identified and studied more than 100 decision-making biases, heuristics
and illusions.”); Birke, supra note 65, at 492–97 (identifying thirty-four psychological concepts that
may interfere with appropriate decisionmaking when evaluating settlement).
75. KAHNEMAN, supra note 67, at 255 (“[T]he optimistic bias may well be the most significant of
the cognitive biases.”); KISER, BEYOND RIGHT AND WRONG, supra note 15, at 124–26 (“Many
psychologists and law professors regard overconfidence as the most significant contributor to
decision-making failures.”).
76. ROBBENNOLT & STERNLIGHT, supra note 54, at 15; KISER, BEYOND RIGHT AND WRONG, supra
note 15, at 126–29.
77. Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Andrew J. Wistrich, Inside the Judicial Mind, 86
CORNELL L. REV. 777, 787–89 (2001) [hereinafter Guthrie et al., Inside]; Jeffrey J. Rachlinski,
Andrew J. Wistrich & Chris Guthrie, Can Judges Make Reliable Numeric Judgments? Distorted
Damages and Skewed Sentences, 90 IND. L.J. 695, 701–05 (2015) [hereniafter Rachlinski et al., Can
Judges Make Reliable Numeric Judgments?].
78. Birke, supra note 65, at 493–94; Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 68, at 1104–07.
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occur before they knew the outcome (“Hindsight is 20/20”)79;
and
▪ The sunk-cost fallacy: There is a psychological investment in
prior decisions, which causes people to overweigh costs
already incurred when making decisions about costs to be
incurred in the future.80
Unfortunately, intuitive biases are generally studied individually, and
individual principles are rarely encountered in isolation in civil litigation,
so little is known about which biases will trump other biases when people
make decisions during litigation.81
2.

Negotiation

In trying to resolve their case, parties and lawyers must choose a
negotiation strategy and must contend with the negotiation strategy or
tactics taken by the other side. There are a wide range of approaches to
negotiation.82 Furthermore, negotiation theorists do not agree on the
number of different styles or techniques of negotiation or even the
terminology for them.83 In 1983 Gerald Williams concluded that attorneys
employed two primary styles of negotiation: cooperative and
competitive.84 That same year Carrie Menkel-Meadow also divided
negotiation behavior into two different styles: problem-solving and
adversarial.85 Other commentators have divided negotiation behavior into
three, four, or five categories.86
Economists, psychologists, lawyers, and others have studied
negotiation theory for approximately forty years.87 Since the early 2000s,
negotiation theory has been enriched by insights into how individuals
79. KAHNEMAN, supra note 67, at 203, KISER, BEYOND RIGHT AND WRONG, supra note 15, at 132,
199; Guthrie et al., Inside, supra note 77, at 799.
80. KAHNEMAN, supra note 67, at 345; KISER, BEYOND RIGHT AND WRONG, supra note 15, at
136–39; Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 68, at 1124–26.
81. KISER, BEYOND RIGHT AND WRONG, supra note 15, at 91–92; Birke, supra note 65, at 497–98.
82. ROBBENNOLT & STERNLIGHT, supra note 54, at 254; Gross & Syverud, Getting to No, supra
note 10, at 328 (“The array of possible strategies is virtually unlimited.”).
83. Andrea K. Schneider, Shattering Negotiation Myths: Empirical Evidence on the Effectiveness
of Negotiation Style, 14 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 143, 151–52 (2002).
84. Id. at 149.
85. Id. at 151.
86. Id. Bernard Mayer’s recent book examines whether concepts thought of as opposing approaches
or theories of negotiation are as distinct as previously thought. BERNARD MAYER, THE CONFLICT
PARADOX: SEVEN DILEMMAS AT THE CORE OF DISPUTES (2015).
87. Birke, supra note 65, at 485–98; Andrea K. Schneider & Roy J. Lewicki, The Past and Future
Challenges of Negotiation Theory, 31 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 1, 3–8 (2016).
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resolve disputes from multiple additional fields, including the hard
sciences, anthropology, neuroscience, the study of emotions, complexity
science, and even the physiological bases of willpower.88 Despite the
significant advances in understanding negotiation theory, no general
theory of negotiation claims to describe the optimal settlement strategy,
and “[b]argaining remains an art rather than a science.”89
C.

The Dynamics of Settlement Conferences

A settlement conference involves the exercise of judgment by the
participants—the parties, insurers, lawyers and judge—in a complex
situation with multiple variables. Each of the participants brings his or her
own interests and perspectives to resolution of the case. Reconciling these
different perspectives to reach settlement can be challenging.
1.

The Parties

More often than not, plaintiffs are one-time participants in the legal
system.90 They are sometimes referred to as one-shot players, as they
cannot spread their risk of loss across a number of cases.91 Thus, they tend
to be more risk-averse than defendants.92 In deciding whether to settle, a
plaintiff will consider the amount of a settlement offer in light of the risk
and rewards of continued litigation, the possibility of delay in getting the
case to trial and through an appeal, and personal factors such as available
financial resources, earning capacity, expenses, health, and subjective risk
preferences.93 Further, litigation can be an extremely stressful
experience.94 Litigants may be unfamiliar with the court process and too
emotionally invested in the case to make intelligent decisions about the
advantages of settlement.95
88. Roy F. Baumeister et al., The Glucose Model of Mediation: Physiological Bases of Willpower
as Important Explanations for Common Mediation Behavior, 15 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 377 (2015);
Birke, supra note 65, at 523–24; Schneider & Lewicki, supra note 87, at 4–7; Martha E. Simmons,
Calming the Chaos: A Complexity Science Approach to Dispute Resolution on a Macro and Micro
Level, 17 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 157 (2017).
89. Gross & Syverud, Getting to No, supra note 10, at 327.
90. Id. at 349; Gross & Syverud, Don’t Try, supra note 7, at 55.
91. Gross & Syverud, Getting to No, supra note 10, at 349; Gross & Syverud, Don’t Try, supra note 7, at 55.
92. Gross & Syverud, Getting to No, supra note 10, at 349; Gross & Syverud, Don’t Try, supra note 7, at 55.
93. Gross & Syverud, Getting to No, supra note 10, at 352; Kiser et al., Let’s Not Make a
Deal, supra note 55, at 552.
94. ROBBENNOLT & STERNLIGHT, supra note 54, at 45; Michaela Keet, Informed Decision-making in
Judicial Mediation and the Assessment of Litigation Risk, 33 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 65, 71 (2018).
95. Gross & Syverud, Getting to No, supra note 10, at 372; Robert Rack, A Letter to My Successor,

14 - Lynch (2).docx (Do Not Delete)

2019]

IMPROVING SETTLEMENT CONFERENCES

10/21/2019 5:02 PM

1249

In contrast, entities that get sued regularly—insurance companies, large
businesses and government agencies—are considered repeat players in the
litigation process.96 Because of their frequent participation in litigation,
repeat players tend to be more sophisticated about the court process and
more focused on goals beyond the outcome of the particular case.97
Accordingly, they tend to bargain strategically to influence the outcomes
of other cases.98
People have their own preferred approach to decisionmaking. 99 When
making a decision, some people will rely solely on instinct, while others
will “view a decision from either a promotion perspective (trying to make
decisions that ensure positive outcomes and take advantage of
opportunities) or a prevention perspective (trying to make decisions that
minimize harm and avoid mistakes).”100 Some litigants will “have a deep
need for closure, [while] others will be much more comfortable with
suspending judgment, considering other perspectives, and entertaining
alternatives; and some will be inclined to avoid making a decision at
all.”101
Parties may make mistakes when assessing the value of their case and
deciding whether to settle.102 They may choose not to settle their case
because they do not trust their lawyer’s assessment of the case.103 One
study showed that more than half of the cases that went to trial did not
settle before trial because one of the parties rejected its own lawyer’s
recommendation to settle.104 Also, plaintiffs may pursue legally irrelevant
issues, such as social and emotional benefits from litigation, in contrast to
their lawyers, who typically view the case in strictly economic terms.105
26 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 429, 430 (2011).
96. Gross & Syverud, Don’t Try, supra note 7, at 55.
97. Id. at 56; Galanter & Cahill, supra note 6, at 1385–86.
98. Gross & Syverud, Don’t Try, supra note 7, at 53.
99. ROBBENNOLT & STERNLIGHT, supra note 54, at 232.
100. Id. at 232–33.
101. Id.; see also Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 68, at 1079 (“In any given choice situation, actors
might use a nearly infinite number of decision-making strategies that deviate from the predictions of
expected utility theory.”).
102. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.2(a) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2012) (“A lawyer shall
abide by a client’s decision whether to settle a matter.”); Guthrie & Rachlinski, Insurers, supra note
67, at 2019 (“[L]awyers and judges can only do so much to ameliorate the potential foolishness of the
litigants who, in the end, must decide how to conduct themselves.”); Andrew J. Wistrich & Jeffrey J.
Rachlinski, How Lawyers’ Intuitions Prolong Litigation, 86 S. CAL. L. REV. 571, 577–78 (2013)
[hereinafter Wistrich & Rachlinski, Lawyers’ Intuitions].
103. Miller, supra note 50, at 35.
104. COLE ET AL., supra note 45, at § 13:7.
105. See ROBBENNOLT & STERNLIGHT, supra note 54, at 258; Alberstein, supra note 33, at 890;

14 - Lynch (2).docx (Do Not Delete)

10/21/2019 5:02 PM

1250

[Vol. 94:1233

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

Ideally, parties would make decisions after obtaining all relevant
information, analyzing their options, and making trade-offs among the
various components that apply to the decision.106 This rarely happens,
though, because people generally cannot obtain full information and lack
the time to consider all possible options.107 And, as discussed above, they
are susceptible to intuitive biases that may prevent them from analyzing
their options clearly or selecting the options that promise the greatest
return.108
Intuitive biases can affect decisionmaking at all stages of a case. The
attribution bias shifts attention from the actual events and conditions that
preceded the litigation to the perceived motives and character flaws of
another individual or organization.109 This bias may influence whether
suit will be filed and may also raise emotional barriers to settlement.110
During the discovery process, parties may unconsciously seek additional
information that confirms their preexisting views, disregard conflicting
information, and assess evidence by the extent to which it is consistent
with their expectations (confirmation bias and biased assimilation).111
They may also emphasize anecdotal information and concrete, as opposed
to abstract, information while ignoring statistical or quantitative
information (the representativeness and availability biases).112 Optimistic
overconfidence may cause litigants to unrealistically assess their chances
of prevailing in court and predicting the outcome at trial.113 This bias may
combine with the sunk-cost bias, which affects decisionmaking in two
ways.114 First, because of large costs incurred prior to settlement
discussions, litigants may decide to make increased expenditures to
protect the already incurred costs.115 Also, there is a psychological
investment in prior litigation decisions, and litigants may feel a need to

Tamara Relis, “It’s Not About the Money!”: A Theory on Misconceptions of Plaintiffs’ Litigation
Aims, 68 U. PITT. L. REV. 341, 373 (2006).
106. ROBBENNOLT & STERNLIGHT, supra note 54, at 85.
107. Id.; Birke & Fox, supra note 52, at 1–2; Rachlinski, supra note 55, at 118.
108. See supra note *.
109. KISER, BEYOND RIGHT AND WRONG, supra note 15, at 92–97.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 127–28; ROBBENNOLT & STERNLIGHT, supra note 54, at 15.
112. KISER, BEYOND RIGHT AND WRONG, supra note 15, at 129–32; ROBBENNOLT & STERNLIGHT,
supra note 54, at 72–73.
113. KISER, BEYOND RIGHT AND WRONG, supra note 15, at 27; ROBBENNOLT & STERNLIGHT,
supra note 54, at 68–69.
114. KAHNEMAN, supra note 67, at 345; KISER, BEYOND RIGHT AND WRONG, supra note 15, at 136–39.
115. KAHNEMAN, supra note 67, at 345; KISER, BEYOND RIGHT AND WRONG, supra note 15, at 136–38.
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justify those decisions.116 In settlement negotiations, litigants may anchor
on damage awards in memorable cases or best-case scenarios instead of
focusing on more realistic probabilities.117 They may also react
emotionally, which may affect their ability to convey information and
make good decisions (the affect heuristic).118 Intuitive biases act in
concert, so that a relatively minor susceptibility to multiple biases may
have significant influence.119
2.

Insurers

Insurers play a key role in the civil justice system. In most personal
injury litigation, the individual defendant is insured, and the insurer
provides a defense and exercises complete control over whether to settle
the case.120 Insurance is also the norm in medical malpractice cases, but
there is an important difference: most malpractice policies require the
insurer to obtain the physician’s consent to settle the case.121 Hospitals
often have liability insurance for malpractice claims, but they may have a
large deductible and may have to pay a portion of the defense costs.122
Insurance coverage is less likely in cases involving commercial
transactions, real estate, and contract disputes.123
Insurance companies require their counsel to analyze the case and
provide a written evaluation of all pertinent aspects of the case well before
the settlement conference.124 The insurer will consider the information
provided—using a claim committee or other internal process—and decide
on its valuation of the case.125 The insurer’s representative who attends
the conference may not tell the defense lawyer the extent of the authority
he or she has to settle the case.126

116. KAHNEMAN, supra note 67, at 345; KISER, BEYOND RIGHT AND WRONG, supra note 15, at 136–38.
117. KISER, BEYOND RIGHT AND WRONG, supra note 15, at 115–20; ROBBENNOLT & STERNLIGHT,
supra note 54, at 72.
118. KAHNEMAN, supra note 67, at 346–48; ROBBENNOLT & STERNLIGHT, supra note 54, at 285, 289.
119. KISER, BEYOND RIGHT AND WRONG, supra note 15, at 91–92.
120. KISER, BEYOND RIGHT AND WRONG, supra note 15, at 56; Gross & Syverud, Getting to No,
supra note 10, at 360–61; Guthrie & Rachlinski, Insurers, supra note 67, at 2020.
121. Gross & Syverud, Getting to No, supra note 10, at 361.
122. Id. at 363.
123. Id. at 367, 371, 377; KISER, BEYOND RIGHT AND WRONG, supra note 15, at 56.
124. E-mail from Kari Cole to William Lynch (Oct. 31, 2018, 07:04 PM) (on file with author); Email from Michael Dickman to William Lynch (Oct. 31, 2018, 12:18 PM) (on file with author); Email from Robert Sabin to William Lynch (Oct. 15, 2018, 11:26 AM) (on file with author).
125. Id.
126. E-mail from Michael Dickman to William Lynch (Oct. 31, 2018, 12:18 PM) (on file with author).
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A study by Randall Kiser demonstrates that the existence of insurance
coverage is correlated with notable differences in plaintiff and defendant
settlement error rates and the costs of those errors when cases proceed to
trial.127 Plaintiffs’ decision error rate was slightly higher in cases where
the defendant had insurance (62% v. 58%), while the defendants’ decision
error rate was lower when the defendant had insurance (22% v. 30%).128
Further, the plaintiffs’ cost of decision error was considerably higher in
cases with an insured defendant ($83,665 v. $60,644), while defendants
with insurance coverage had a substantially lower mean cost of error than
defendants without insurance ($1,076,082 v. $1,683,437).129 Kiser
suggests that multiple factors may explain the relatively low error rates
for insured defendants: “experienced claims management, extensive data
regarding similar cases . . . regular reporting of case status and
explanation of settlement positions, [and] ongoing evaluation of liability
and reserve amounts,” among other factors.130
A study of insurance company claim professionals by Chris Guthrie
and Jeffrey Rachlinski suggests an additional reason for lower decision
error rates when defendants have insurance: insurers are less likely to be
affected by the intuitive biases discussed above.131 The study found that
while insurers were not impervious to anchoring effects, they were less
likely than others to be influenced by them.132 They demonstrated some
resistance to framing and adopted a risk-neutral perspective.133 They were
not susceptible to self-serving biases in evaluating cases for settlement.134
According to the authors, this suggests that, relative to uninsured parties,
insurers are more likely to value cases objectively, to offer more equitable
settlements, and to settle more cases.135
3.

The Lawyers

Plaintiffs’ lawyers are considered repeat players, and as such they can
limit the strategic bargaining power of defendants and restore some

127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.

KISER, BEYOND RIGHT AND WRONG, supra note 15, at 73–76.
Id. at 74.
Id.
Id.
Guthrie & Rachlinski, Insurers, supra note 67, at 2022.
Id. at 2025–33.
Id. at 2033–42.
Id. at 2047–48.
Id. at 2048–49.
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balance to the litigation process.136 Lawyers can be extremely influential
in shaping their clients’ decisions regarding settlement.137 Just as parties
may make mistakes when evaluating cases, lawyers can make mistakes
that interfere with settlement in several ways. Studies have shown that
lawyers, like many other professionals, are overconfident and that there is
no relationship between levels of confidence and decisionmaking
accuracy.138 Lawyers can inaccurately predict the likely outcome of trials
because they make overly optimistic assessments of their cases.139 They
tend to view the evidence in the light most favorable to their case, they
overestimate their abilities and underestimate the abilities of their
opponents, and they overestimate their ability to control outcomes that are
determined by factors outside their control.140 If lawyers are overconfident
about their chances at trial, they may make unrealistic settlement demands
and offer fewer concessions during negotiations.141
Lawyers may fail to bargain properly for reasons extrinsic to the case.
Plaintiffs’ lawyers may bargain strategically to increase future settlements
or to develop a reputation for toughness or resolve.142 Conversely, lawyers
for repeat party litigants—insurance companies and large business that are
frequently sued—may bargain strategically to attempt to discourage
future litigation and induce plaintiffs to accept settlements below the
expected value of their claims.143 Trials may occur when such strategic
bargaining misfires.
When evaluating cases, lawyers are also vulnerable to many of the
same kinds of intuitive biases that mislead their clients. Lawyers are
influenced by the framing effect—they treat economically equivalent
gains and losses differently—which leads them to take chances on trials
that are not worth taking.144 They are influenced by confirmation bias and
nonconsequentialist reasoning, which causes them to gather more
information than they need and to interpret conflicting information in self-

136. Galanter & Cahill, supra note 6, at 1386; Gross & Syverud, Getting to No, supra note 10, at
350; Guthrie & Rachlinski, Insurers, supra note 67, at 2022.
137. Gross & Syverud, Getting to No, supra note 10, at 351.
138. KISER, BEYOND RIGHT AND WRONG, supra note 15, at 298; Birke & Fox, supra note 52, at 13–14.
139. KISER, BEYOND RIGHT AND WRONG, supra note 15, at 124–26; ROBBENNOLT & STERNLIGHT,
supra note 54, at 68–69; Birke & Fox, supra note 53, at 13–18; Wistrich & Rachlinski, Lawyers’
Intuitions, supra note 102, at 579–80.
140. KISER, BEYOND RIGHT AND WRONG, supra note 15, at 126; Birke & Fox, supra note 52, at 13–18.
141. Birke & Fox, supra note 52, at 13–18.
142. Gross & Syverud, Getting to No, supra note 10, at 389.
143. Id.
144. Wistrich & Rachlinski, Lawyers’ Intuitions, supra note 102, at 589–92.
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serving ways by disregarding information that suggests their position
might be wrong.145 They are also subject to the sunk-cost fallacy, in which
they make decisions based on past costs, unduly influencing their analysis
of the future costs and benefits of proceeding to trial.146 By relying heavily
on intuition, rather than deliberative mental processing, to evaluate cases,
lawyers may make poor decisions about whether and when to settle
cases.147
Lawyers may also have financial interests that conflict with those of
their clients. A lawyer billing by the hour may be inclined to spend more
time on a case than the client desires and may be reluctant to settle the
case without additional discovery or motion practice.148 In contrast, a
lawyer paid on a contingency basis or on a flat-fee basis may be inclined
to minimize the amount of time spent on a case and may push for an early
settlement before spending much time on the case.149
4.

The Judge

While judges may be experienced and well-trained decision makers,
they are still human. Research shows that judges, like litigants and
lawyers, rely on the same decisionmaking processes that can produce
systemic errors when evaluating cases.150 For example, studies show that
numerical “anchors” trigger intuitive judicial decisionmaking.151 Anchors
can arise from multiple sources, including settlement demands, policy
limits, and caps on allowable damages, and study after study shows that
judges are powerfully influenced by them.152 One study demonstrated that
an unrealistically high demand made at a settlement conference served as
an anchor to increase the amount of damages subsequently awarded by

145. Id. at 594–612; Birke & Fox supra note 52, at 16, 21–28.
146. Wistrich & Rachlinski, Lawyers’ Intuitions, supra note 102, at 612–20.
147. Id. at 587.
148. ROBBENNOLT & STERNLIGHT, supra note 54, at 395–98; Rachlinski, supra note 55, at 172.
149. ROBBENNOLT & STERNLIGHT, supra note 54, at 395–98; Rachlinski, supra note 55, at 172.
150. Guthrie et al., Inside, supra note 77, at 779; see also Guthrie et al., Blinking, supra note 69, at
27–28.
151. Guthrie et al., Inside, supra note 77, at 787–94; Guthrie et al., Blinking, supra note 69, at 20–
21; Rachlinski et al., Can Judges Make Reliable Numeric Judgments? supra note 77, at 735–36;
Andrew J. Wistrich, Chris Guthrie & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Can Judges Ignore Inadmissible
Information? The Difficulty of Deliberately Disregarding, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 1251, 1286–94 (2005)
[hereinafter, Wistrich et al., Can Judges Ignore].
152. Guthrie et al., Inside, supra note 77, at 787-794; Guthrie et al., Blinking, supra note 69, at 1921; Wistrich et al., Can Judges Ignore, supra note 151, at 1286–93; ROBBENNOLT & STERNLIGHT,
supra note 54, at 72.
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the judges.153 Judges in the anchor group learned that the plaintiff’s lawyer
had demanded $10 million in damages at the settlement conference, while
judges in the control group learned that the plaintiff’s lawyer had asked
only for a significant monetary recovery.154 Knowledge of the $10 million
demand clearly influenced the judges: they awarded over $2,200,000 on
average, while the judges in the control group awarded $808,000 on
average.155 Another study showed that a motion to dismiss on the ground
that the case failed to meet the $75,000 jurisdictional minimum served as
an anchor to lower the amount of damages awarded by the judges.156
Judges in the anchor group were first asked to rule on the motion to
dismiss before awarding damages, but the judges in the control group
were not informed about the motion to dismiss and were simply asked to
award damages.157 The $75,000 jurisdictional minimum served as an
anchor: the judges in the anchor group awarded an average of $882,000,
while the judges in the control group awarded an average of $1,249,000.158
Other research confirms that judges are predominantly intuitive
decisionmakers.159 They are influenced by the same intuitive biases
discussed above, for example, the framing effect, the representativeness
heuristic, the hindsight bias, and the affect bias.160 Studies show that the
decisions judges make at a settlement conference are more likely to be
intuitive rather than deliberative and well reasoned.161 Further, recent
studies show that shifting the judge’s attention by presenting the judge
with additional information or altering the way the information is
presented can alter the judge’s decisions.162
Many judges would believe that they are impervious to the effects of
these intuitive biases and that they know the value of a fair settlement.
Judges are often very confident in their decisionmaking abilities, but it is
important to be skeptical of judges’ own assessments of their abilities.
Studies show that judges, like all people, are susceptible to egocentric bias
153. Wistrich et al., Can Judges Ignore, supra note 151, at 1288–90.
154. Id. at 1288–89.
155. Id. at 1290.
156. Guthrie et al., Inside, supra note 77, at 790–92.
157. Id. at 790–91.
158. Id. at 791–92.
159. Guthrie et al., Blinking, supra note 69, at 6–8.
160. See supra note *.
161. Guthrie et al., Blinking, supra note 69, at 36.
162. Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Andrew J. Wistrich, & Chris Guthrie, Altering Attention in Adjudication,
60 UCLA L. REV. 1586, 1615–16 (2013) (Judges are “vulnerable to distraction, misdirection, and
manipulation . . . . [T]heir attention may be shifted to the wrong place at the wrong time, rendering
them susceptible to sophistry.”).
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and overconfidence.163 Due to these biases, judges overestimate their own
abilities and are more confident in their decisions than is appropriate,
which makes it hard for them to recognize that their decisions may be
mistaken.164
A judge’s evaluation of a case may be improperly influenced by the
lawyers themselves. Lawyers often present the facts they think are most
advantageous to their position at the settlement conference and may be
reluctant to acknowledge deficiencies in their case. As Judge Posner
stated recently, “[l]awyers are advocates; one can’t expect candor from
them.”165 Judges cannot know what agendas or facts the parties are hiding
from them at the settlement conference, what arguments and evidence
opposing parties might present at trial, and what strategies they might
pursue.166 Both sides may be less than candid about their analysis of the
factual and legal issues and about what issues are driving their negotiation
strategy.167
Also, judges may know less about the case than they think and may
devote too little time preparing for and conducting the settlement
conference. One study reported that some judges spend one to one-and-ahalf hours preparing for a settlement conference.168 Even judges who
spend more time preparing can do little more than review written
materials provided by the parties, which does not allow them to judge a
crucial issue—the credibility of the witnesses.169 Judges typically
schedule a half day or less for a settlement conference.170 Because the
163. Guthrie et al., Inside, supra note 77, at 811–16. Egocentric bias is pervasive: most people
overestimate their abilities relative to their peers. For example, “[n]inety-four percent of university
professors believe they do a better job than their colleagues.” Birke & Fox, supra note 52, at 17–18.
Similarly, 97.2% of judges in one study believed that they were better able than their colleagues to
avoid the influence of race and gender bias. Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Andrew J. Wistrich,
The “Hidden Judiciary”: An Empirical Examination of Executive Branch Justice, 58 DUKE L.J. 1477,
1519 (2009).
164. Guthrie et al., Inside, supra note 77, at 813–15, 828.
165. RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY, STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES 387 (2017).
166. ROBBENNOLT & STERNLIGHT, supra note 54, at 389, 401; Brazil, Hosting Mediations, supra
note 40, at 254, 257.
167. Wayne Brazil, The Mediator as Medium: Reflections on Boxes; Black, Transparent, Refractive, and
Gray, DISP. RESOL. MAG., Winter 2017, at 22, 23–26 [hereinafter Brazil, Mediator as Medium]; Email from
George Bach to William Lynch (Oct. 28. 2018, 03:44 PM) (on file with author).
168. Welsh, supra note 17, at 1002.
169. Kothe v. Smith, 771 F.2d 667, 670 (2d Cir. 1985) (“As every experienced trial lawyer knows,
the personalities of the parties and their witnesses play an important role in litigation.”); Posner, The
Summary Jury Trial and Other Methods of Alternative Dispute Resolution, supra note 30, at 374
(“The jury’s principal functions is to determine the credibility of witnesses,” and the “jury may react
quite differently when confronted with the actual witnesses.”).
170. Welsh, supra note 17, at 1002; Wissler, supra note 31, at 277–79.
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lawyers are more familiar with the case than the judge, they may have a
better grasp of the intangible factors that affect the settlement value of the
case.171 Evaluating a case with only a generalized understanding of the
facts, or based on incomplete or misleading information provided by the
parties, may lead to inaccurate conclusions.
As set out above, all the participants in a settlement conference are
subject to intuitive biases and other factors unique to each participant that
may cause them to incorrectly assess the value of a case and how it should
be resolved. Because there is no scientific process for evaluating a case
for settlement, the settlement conference process should be designed to
ensure that judges do not coerce the parties into settlement and instead
help the parties focus on the issues at hand. Additionally, the judge and
the parties should not be distracted by extraneous factors such as
arguments over good faith participation that divert their attention to
subsidiary issues that interfere with reaching settlement.
III. ADVANTAGES OF SETTLEMENT CONFERENCES
There can be important advantages to a settlement conference
conducted by a judge. For some parties, it is important to feel that they
have had their “day in court.”172 Settlement conferences in federal court
are typically held at a federal courthouse, frequently in a courtroom, the
judge may wear a robe while in session, and the party can address the
judge directly while in separate caucus.173 The parties incur no costs for
the judge’s time, although they must still prepare for and attend the
conference.174 Sometimes parties fear that being the first to propose
settlement discussions suggests weakness or lack of confidence in their
case.175 If the court orders the parties to the settlement conference, neither
side has to worry about conveying a perception of weakness.176 The judge
may require the presence of non-parties such as insurers or other
representatives.177
A judge may have more credibility with a party than a mediator would
171. Killefer, supra note 50, at 19; Sherman, supra note 27, at 2087–88 (“[T]he parties are in the
best position to know the facts and appreciate their objectives.”).
172. See Deason, supra note 16, at 107–08.
173. Deason, supra note 16, at 107’ Killefer, supra note 50, at 22; Miller, supra note 50, at 33–34;
Welsh, supra note 17, at 1002.
174. Deason, supra note 16, at 107.
175. Miller, supra note 50, at 34; Wistrich & Rachlinski, Lawyers’ Intuitions, supra note 102, at 577.
176. Rack, supra note 95, at 431; Miller, supra note 50, at 34; Wistrich & Rachlinski, Lawyers’
Intuitions, supra note 102, at 577;.
177. FED. R. CIV. P. 16(c)(1); Parness, supra note 33, at 1897.
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by virtue of the inherent respect and authority of his or her position as a
judge.178 Some parties may not have accurately evaluated their cases or
may not trust their lawyers’ advice about settlement. In those
circumstances, the judge can assist counsel by evaluating the case and
explaining to the party the dangers of proceeding to trial.179 Judges may
be in a position to help bridge the gap between the parties because they
“are in a unique position to re-frame settlement decisions for the parties
because they have no stake in the outcome” of the case.180 Judges may be
able to manage difficult parties better because of their “greater status,
authority, and credibility,” and they may also be able to offset bargaining
imbalances between parties with unequal sophistication and resources.181
The judge may have greater knowledge about the potential jury pool than
counsel or a private mediator.182
Finally, a judge who is assigned to the case may have an informational
and efficiency advantage. A judge who has ruled on discovery or
dispositive motions may have in-depth knowledge of the facts, the legal
issues, parties, and counsel that another judge or a mediator cannot easily
duplicate at the start of a settlement conference or mediation.183
IV. RISKS OF SETTLEMENT CONFERENCES
While there may be certain advantages to settlement conferences, there
are also very real risks. The possibility of coercion is inherent in the
structure of a settlement conference because the judge may rule on
substantive or procedural motions in the present case or future cases after
an unsuccessful settlement conference. This potential is heightened by the
good faith participation requirement imposed by Rule 16 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. Parties may feel pressured to settle their cases
to ensure that they are not sanctioned for their level of participation at the
conference. Litigation over the requisite level of participation at the
settlement conference threatens the confidentiality that is essential to the
integrity of the settlement process. Further, satellite litigation over how
the parties participated could undermine the primary purpose of
settlement conferences—reducing court congestion.

178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.

Deason, supra note 16, at 105–06; Wissler, supra note 31, at 292–93; Miller supra note 50, at 33.
Deason, supra note 16, at 106; Miller, supra note 50, at 34–35.
Guthrie et al., Inside, supra note 77, at 822.
Wissler, supra note 31, at 295; Galanter & Cahill, supra note 6, at 1346; Parness, supra note 33, at 1897.
Galanter & Cahill, supra note 6, at 1344.
Wissler, supra note 31, at 293; Deason, supra note 16, at 108; Killefer, supra note 50, at 19.
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The Potential for Coercion

Courts must provide litigants with a forum in which they will receive
both substantive and procedural justice.184 Procedural fairness in ADR
includes an opportunity for the parties to express their positions, thorough
consideration of the issues by a neutral, respectful decisionmaker, and
lack of pressure or coercion to settle the case.185 The Commentary to the
Code of Conduct for federal judges cautions that “[a] judge may
encourage and seek to facilitate settlement but should not act in a manner
that coerces any party into surrendering the right to have the controversy
resolved by the courts.”186 Allowing judges to actively promote settlement
of civil cases in federal court contrasts sharply with the prohibition of
judges being involved in settlement discussion in criminal cases. In 1975,
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11 was amended to provide that the
court “must not participate” in discussions with a defendant to reach a plea
agreement.187 As the United States Supreme Court recognized, this
prohibition ensures that a defendant will not “be induced to plead guilty
rather than risk displeasing the judge who would preside at trial.”188
Plaintiffs have complained that they were forced to accept paltry and
inadequate settlements, while defendants have asserted that judges forced
them into large settlements that were not appropriate.189 Parties who feel
pressured during a settlement conference to settle their case will not
respect the process, which could undermine public respect for the judicial
system.190
Some judges are proud of the assertive style they use at settlement
conferences, which they believe helps them settle difficult cases.191 But
even judges who do not purposely use an assertive style may feel subtle
pressure to resolve cases at a settlement conference. For example, judges
might feel such pressure if they know that the court keeps track of their
rate of success at settlement conference.192

184. Welsh, supra note 17, at 1022–28, 1045.
185. Id.; Wissler, supra note 31, at 300–02.
186. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT FOR U.S. JUDGES Canon 3A(4) (ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S.
COURTS 2014).
187. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(c)(1).
188. United States v. Davila, 569 U.S. 597, 606 (2013).
189. Cratsley, supra note 34, at 590–92; Galanter & Cahill, supra note 6, at 1353; Killefer, supra
note 50, at 19–20.
190. Brazil, Continuing the Conversation, supra note 5, at 26–27; Miller, supra note 50, at 37.
191. Deason, supra note 16, at 110.
192. Brazil, Continuing the Conversation, supra note 5, at 26 n.47; Rack, supra note 95, at 436.
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Judicial involvement in settlement conferences brings with it the
possibility that the parties will settle the case under an explicit threat of
coercion. In one case, a defendant was sanctioned when he did not accept
the trial judge’s recommended settlement amount before trial but settled
for a similar amount after the first day of trial.193 In imposing the sanction,
the trial judge stated that he was “‘determined to get the attention of the
carrier’ and that ‘the carriers are going to have to wake up when a judge
tells them that [he wants] to settle a case and they don’t want to settle
it.’”194 The Second Circuit reversed the award of sanctions, holding that
parties may not be sanctioned for failing to concur with the judge’s
evaluation of the case and that a judge should not directly or indirectly
effect settlements through coercion.195 The court recognized that while
Rule 16 was amended in 1983 to encourage pretrial settlement
discussions, the Advisory Committee Notes make clear that its purpose
was not to “impose settlement negotiations on unwilling litigants.”196 The
court concluded that Rule 16 “was not designed as a means for clubbing
the parties—or one of them—into an involuntary compromise.”197
Even if judges do not explicitly threaten retribution if the case does not
settle, judicial involvement in settlement discussions brings with it an
implicit threat of coercion. Parties may worry that adverse consequences
might follow if they do not settle the case at the settlement conference.198
If the trial judge holds the settlement conference, a party may fear that its
refusal to settle could affect the judge’s subsequent rulings on dispositive
motions, motions in limine, evidentiary issues during trial, jury
instructions, or post-trial motions.199 If the pretrial judge holds the
settlement conference, a party may be concerned about the judge’s rulings

193. Kothe v. Smith, 771 F.2d 667, 668–69 (2d Cir. 1985).
194. Id. at 669.
195. Id.
196. Id. (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 16 advisory committee’s note to 1983 amendment).
197. Id.; see also Cratsley, supra note 34 at 590–92; Deason, supra note 16, at 110–11 (reporting
other examples of explicit coercion by judges at settlement conference). The trial judge’s approach in
Kothe is apparently not an isolated occurrence. Several lawyers reported that, although their clients
subsequently prevailed on the merits of the case, their clients were sanctioned or threatened with
sanctions for failing to make an offer at a settlement conference. Email from Jennifer Noya to William
Lynch (Oct. 14, 2018, 08:31 PM) (on file with author); Email from Kari Cole to William Lynch (Oct.
31, 2018, 07:22 PM) (on file with author); Email from Christopher De Lara to William Lynch (Feb.
21, 2019, 02:51 PM) (on file with author).
198. Killefer, supra note 50, at 18–19; Miller, supra note 50, at 37. Because settlement conferences
are not held on the record it will be difficult for a party to establish improper coercion during an ex
parte session with the judge at the conference. Id., at 22; Deason, supra note 16, at 113.
199. Killefer, supra note 50, at 19.
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on scheduling deadlines, discovery issues, or other preliminary matters.200
The lawyers may also worry that the judge will hold their actions at
settlement conference against them in future cases.201
A study conducted in the Southern District of Ohio that compared
attorneys’ attitudes about various forms of ADR confirms these fears.202
Lawyers who participated in the study thought that they could be less
candid and less able to explore settlement with judges assigned to the case
without prejudice to the ongoing litigation if the case did not settle.203
They also believed that judges assigned to the case were much more likely
to be biased than the other neutrals.204 Lawyers believe that judges are
eager to settle cases to reduce their trial docket and fear that information
discussed at the settlement conference will affect subsequent rulings.205
Parties may therefore be reluctant to fully disclose information at a
settlement conference.206 They may also attempt to bargain tactically, by
exaggerating their strengths and minimizing their weaknesses, in an
attempt to influence the judge if the case proceeds to trial.207
The potential for coercion is exacerbated by Rule 16, which provides
that the court may sanction a party who “is substantially unprepared to
participate—or does not participate in good faith—in the conference.”208
The Rules and Advisory Committee notes do not define what constitutes
good faith participation at a settlement conference.209 As many
commentators have noted, good faith participation is difficult to define,
and the ad hoc nature of case adjudication provides scant guidance as to
the minimum level of participation required at a settlement conference.210
Courts consistently state that a judge may not coerce a settlement or
force a party to make an offer at a settlement conference.211 As the Fifth
200. Deason, supra note 16, at 111–12.
201. Wissler, supra note 31, at 313, 317, 305 n.140.
202. Id. at 274–75.
203. Id. at 284–86.
204. Id. at 287–88.
205. Id. at 303–04.
206. Id. at 304.
207. Id.
208. FED. R. CIV. P. 16(f)(1)(B).
209. See id.; FED. R. CIV. P. 16 advisory committee’s notes.
210. Brazil, Continuing the Conversation, supra note 5, at 31–32; Kovach, Good Faith, supra note
43, at 599–600 (“[T]he courts, in particular, have struggled with defining good faith . . . [b]ut, in the
end, perhaps it is like obscenity: you know it when you see it.”); Sherman, supra note 27, at 2092
(“The lack of a substantive entitlement in ADR makes it especially difficult to define the content of
good faith participation.”).
211. See Gevas v. Ghosh, 566 F.3d 717, 719 (7th Cir. 2009); Negron v. Woodhull Hospital, 173
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Circuit stated, “there is no meaningful difference between coercion of an
offer and coercion of a settlement: if a party is forced to make a settlement
offer because of the threat of sanctions, and the offer is accepted, a
settlement has been achieved through coercion.”212 But judges have
considerable discretion to interpret what constitutes good faith
participation at a settlement conference, and the line between
“(acceptably) encouraging a settlement to (unacceptably) coercing”
settlement is not bright as the boundaries of sanctionable conduct seem to
vary by judge.213 For example, in a later Fifth Circuit case, the court
affirmed an award of sanctions despite the fact that the defendant
increased its settlement offer from $50,000 to $100,000 at the settlement
conference.214 Although the court stated in passing that a party may not
be sanctioned for failing to make what the settlement conference judge
considered a serious offer, the court inferred lack of good faith
participation in part from defendant’s refusal to make a settlement offer
“with a realistic potential of being accepted by the plaintiff.”215 The lack
of an objective standard for assessing good faith participation at a
settlement conference may contribute to the parties’ perception of
coercion and has caused increased litigation that may worsen court
congestion, the very thing that settlement conferences were developed to
address.216
B.

Loss of Confidentiality

Numerous cases and commentators have recognized that
confidentiality is essential to the integrity of ADR processes.217
Confidentiality allows parties to raise sensitive issues and discuss creative
ideas and solutions that they may otherwise be unwilling to discuss.218
Instead of imposing a national standard for rules on confidentiality, the
Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 1998 directed local districts to
provide for the confidentiality of ADR processes and to prohibit the
Fed. App’x 77, 79 (2d Cir. 2006); Gross Graphics Systems, Inc. v. DEV Indus., Inc., 267 F.3d 624,
627 (7th Cir. 2001); Dawson v. United States, 68 F.3d 886, 897 (5th Cir. 1995).
212. Dawson, 68 F.3d at 897.
213. Deason, supra note 16, at 112.
214. Guillory v. Domtar Indus. Inc., 95 F.3d 1320, 1325, 1334–35 (5th Cir. 1996).
215. Id. at 1334–35, 1334 n.13.
216. See infra Part V(C).
217. See, e.g., In re Teligent, 640 F.3d 53, 57–58 (2d Cir. 2011); In re Anonymous, 283 F.3d 627,
636–37 (4th Cir. 2002); Clark v. Stapleton Corp., 957 F.2d 745, 746 (10th Cir. 1992); Dickey, supra
note 42, at 731; Welsh, supra note 17, at 1030–31.
218. In re Teligent, 640 F.3d at 57–58; In re Anonymous, 283 F.3d at 636–37.
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disclosure of confidential communications.219 This process led to
inconsistent rules being adopted by the federal district courts. Some
districts, by local rule, have provided for confidentiality only as provided
in Federal Rule of Evidence 408.220 While Rule 408 prohibits the use of
settlement communications to establish liability or damages, it does not
preclude their use to prove other matters, such as bad faith participation
at a settlement conference.221 Other districts have not addressed the issue
of confidentiality for settlement conferences, even when they have
provided for confidentiality for court-ordered mediations.222 Some
districts provide more expansive confidentiality protections, such that the
settlement conference judge “may not reveal to the trial Judge any
information about offers made, or statements made, by any party at the
settlement conference, other than whether the case was or was not
settled.”223 Yet, by requiring the settlement conference judge to evaluate
what occurred at the settlement conference and report bad faith
participation to the court, other districts undercut their promise of
confidentiality.224 Confidentiality is even more important to the parties
where participation in the settlement conference is court ordered.225 If the
parties are confident that what they say or do at the settlement conference
will not be used against them if the case does not settle, they will be more
forthcoming and may be more open to making concessions and taking
risks to reach an agreement.226 To the extent that parties fear that their
discussions at the settlement conference will be used against them later,
they are more likely to behave strategically in settlement talks. They will
disclose less information to the judge, which will give the judge less to
work with and could lead to a bargaining impasse.227
To be effective at a settlement conference, judges need to build
219. 28 U.S.C. § 652(d) (2003).
220. See, e.g., W.D. MICH. LOCAL CIV. R. 16.2(d).
221. Holly v. UPS Supply Chain Sols., Inc., No. 3:13–CV–980–DJH–CHL, 2015 WL 3850103, at
*9–10 (W.D. Ky. June 22, 2015); Grigoryants v. Safety-Kleen Corp., No. 11–267E, 2014 WL
2214272, at *4 (W.D. Pa. May 28, 2014); Rhoades v. Avon Prods., Inc., 504 F.3d 1151, 1161–62 (9th
Cir. 2007); Thompson, supra note 38, at 417–18.
222. Compare D. HAW. LOCAL R. 16.5, with D. HAW. LOCAL R. 88.1 (no mention of confidentiality
for settlement conferences, while mediations are provided with confidentiality under FRE 408), with
C.D. CAL. LOCAL R. 16–15.8 (confidentiality “applies only to ADR Procedure No. 2, mediations
conducted by the Court’s Mediation Panel”).
223. See, e.g., D.N.M. LOCAL R. CIV. P. 16.2(e).
224. See infra Part IV(C).
225. In re Anonymous, 283 F.3d 627, 637 (4th Cir. 2002).
226. Brazil, Continuing the Conversation, supra note 5, at 30; Deason, supra note 16, at 118.
227. Brazil, Continuing the Conversation, supra note 5, at 30; Deason, supra note 16, at 118.
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relationships with the parties.228 A duty to report bad faith participation
may move the judge from a neutral stance to a judgmental one, threatening
his or her ability to build appropriate relationships.229 Further, the
neutrality of the judge is important to the parties’ perception of the
fairness of the settlement conference process.230 Their perceptions of
fairness are likely to be undermined by their knowledge that the judge
may disclose confidential communications or behaviors during the
settlement conference.231 To ensure the integrity of settlement
conferences, settlement conference communications should not be
disclosed in a motion that seeks sanctions for failing to participate in good
faith.232
C.

Satellite Litigation

One of the stated purposes of the Alternative Dispute Resolution Act
of 1998 was to reduce crowded dockets through “greater efficiency in
achieving settlements.”233 As Kimberlee Kovach presciently stated, “[i]t
would be paradoxical indeed if a process designed to reduce litigation and
ease the administration of justice created its own special brand of vexing
and annoying motion practice.”234 Beyond being simply vexing and
annoying, motions seeking sanctions for failure to participate in good faith
have increased significantly and threaten to undercut the premise that
settlement conferences help reduce court congestion.
While there has been litigation over court-mandated ADR for many
years,235 litigation over the good faith participation requirement has
increased greatly in recent years. In the mid-1990s, commentators
reported that few cases had examined the good faith standard adopted in
Rule 16 in 1983.236 Yet, by 2010, Michael Dickey reported that there had
been an explosion in motion practice related to good faith participation at
court-ordered mediation.237 Not only has that trend continued, but it has
228. Brazil, Continuing the Conversation, supra note 5, at 32.
229. Alfini & McCabe, supra note 27, at 180; Dickey, supra note 42, at 751–56, 758.
230. Dickey, supra note 42, at 754.
231. Welsh, supra note 17, at 1030–31.
232. See infra Part V.C.
233. Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 1998, Pub. L. 105–315, 112 Stat. 2993, § 2(1) (codified
as 28 U.S.C. §§ 651–58 (1998)).
234. Kovach, Good Faith, supra note 43, at 603.
235. See, e.g., In re Novak, 932 F.2d 1397 (11th Cir. 1991); G. Heileman Brewing Co. v. Joseph
Oat Corp., 871 F.2d 648, 653 (7th Cir. 1989); Kothe v. Smith, 771 F.2d 667, 669 (2d Cir. 1985).
236. Kovach, Good Faith, supra note 43, at 578; Sherman, supra note 27, at 2089–91.
237. See Dickey, supra note 42, at 744–50.
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also appeared in motions concerning Rule 16’s requirement that the
parties participate at the settlement conference in good faith. For example,
the Western District of Pennsylvania issued eight opinions in two years
concerning good faith participation at court-annexed ADR.238 Many other
courts239 have been forced to address claims concerning a party’s
participation at a settlement conference.240 This mirrors what happened in
238. See Lea v. PNC Bank, No. 15-776, 2016 WL 738053 (W.D. Pa. Feb. 25, 2016); Palmer v.
Fed. Express Corp., No. 15-202, 2015 WL 9295917 (W.D. Pa. Dec. 18, 2015); ThermoLife Int’l, LLC
v. D.P.S. Nutrition, Inc., No. 15-273, 2015 WL 12781024 (W.D. Pa. Dec. 15, 2015); Exec. Wings,
Inc. v. Dolby, 131 F. Supp. 3d 404 (W.D. Pa. 2015); Blakeney v. Faros Pittsburgh, LLC, No. 14-437,
2015 WL 4162390 (W.D. Pa. Jul. 9, 2015); Vay v. Huston, No. 14-769, 2015 WL 791430 (W.D. Pa.
Feb. 25, 2015); Grigoryants v. Safety-Kleen Corp., No. 11-267E, 2014 WL 2214272 (W.D. Pa. May
28, 2014); Arneault v. O’Toole, No. 1:11–95, 2014 WL 1117900 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 20, 2014), aff’d,
718 Fed. App’x 148 (3d Cir. Dec. 4, 2017).
239. It is somewhat difficult to track the cases because many opinions involving sanctions for good
faith participation are not published. For example, see Joint Brief of Defendant-Appellees, Klein v.
Commerce Energy, Inc., No. 17-1959, 2017 WL 4865135 (3d Cir. Oct. 23, 2017) (Answer brief in
support of District Court’s March 29, 2017 order awarding sanctions for bad faith conduct during
court-ordered mediation; the District Court’s order is not published).
240. Cases from January 1, 2014 to March 30, 2018 include: Brittany O v. Bentonville Sch. Dist.,
No. 5:15-cv-5020, 2017 WL 4005161 (W.D. Ark. Sep. 12, 2017); Barnes-Boers v. TRU 2005 REI,
LLC, No. 2:13-cv-1827-WBS-CMK, 2014 WL 1400952 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 10, 2014), aff’d, 2014 WL
1775491 (E.D. Cal. May 2, 2014); Apelian v. Allstate Ins. Co., No. LA CV 16-4977 GHK (PLAx),
2016 WL 7388276 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 20, 2016), aff’d, 2017 WL 6028742 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 9, 2017);
Anhing Corp. v. Thuan Phong Co., 215 F. Supp. 2d 919 (C.D. Cal. 2015); Concealfab Corp. v. Sabre
Indus., No. 15-cv-01793-CMA-KLM, 2017 WL 4407924 (D. Colo. Aug. 3, 2017); Bakken Waste,
LLC v. Great Am. Ins. Co. of New York, No. 15-cv-00303-CMA-MEH, 2015 WL 4036191 (D. Colo.
June 30, 2015); Peterson v. Murphy, No. 2:16-cv-00075-EJL-REB, 2018 WL 1526070 (D. Idaho Mar.
28, 2018); Koehn v. Tobias, No. 12 C 50321, 2016 WL 4436131 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 23, 2016), aff’d, 866
F.3d 750 (7th Cir. 2017); Morland v. Ghosh, No. 12 CV 0500, 2014 WL 279666 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 24,
2014); Britt Interactive LLC v. A3 Media LLC, No. 1:16-cv-2884-TWP-DML, 2017 WL 3601371
(S.D. Ind. Apr. 14, 2017); Lethiot v. JB Hunt Shipping, No. 3:14-CV-488-CRS, 2017 WL 3044762
(W.D. Ky. July 18, 2017); Holly v. UPS Supply Chain Sols., Inc., No. 3:13-cv-980-DJH-CHL, 2015
WL 4776904 (W.D. Ky. Aug. 12, 2015); MHD-Rockland Inc. v. Aerospace Distribs. Inc., 102 F.
Supp. 3d 734 (D. Md. 2015); Tuscola Wind III, LLC v. Almer Charter Twp., No. 17-cv-10497, 2018
WL 1250476 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 12, 2018); Akbar v. Bangash, No. 15-cv-12688, 2017 WL 2953047
(E.D. Mich. July 11, 2017); Mager v. Wisconsin Cent. Ltd., No. 2:16-cv-145, 2017 WL 8218992
(W.D. Mich. Dec. 28, 2017); Satgunam v. Basson, No. 1:12-cv-00220-PLM, 2016 WL 9274719
(W.D. Mich. Oct. 24, 2016); Great Lakes Gas Transmission Ltd. P’ship v. Essar Steel Minnesota,
LLC, No. 09-CV-3037 (SRN/LIB) 2014 WL 12597430 (D. Minn. Mar. 11, 2014); Ewald v. Royal
Norwegian Embassy, No. 11-cv-2116 (SRN/SER), 2014 WL 5840566 (D. Minn. Mar. 7, 2014); Hall
v. Kirkegard, No. CV-1400011-H-DLT-JTJ, 2017 WL 8787176 (D. Mont. July 31, 2017); Cross v.
Jaeger, No. 3:13-cv-00433-MMD-WGC, 2017 WL 2255754 (D. Nev. May 22, 2017); Hologram
USA, Inc. v. Pulse Evolution Corp., No. 2:14-cv-0772-GMN-NJK, 2016 WL 2757377 (D. Nev. May
11, 2016); Richard v. Nevada, No. 2:12-cv-01236-GMN-CWH, 2016 WL 1294337 (D. Nev. Mar. 11,
2016); Griego v. Douglas, 264 F. Supp. 3d 1109 (D.N.M. 2017); Alvarez v. GEICO Ins. Agency, Inc.,
No. 15-cv-0198 MV/SCY, 2016 WL 7173811 (D.N.M. Feb. 29, 2016); Super Express USA Publ’g
Corp. v. Spring Publ’g Corp., No. 13-CV-2814 (DLI)(JO), 2018 WL 2078234 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 23,
2018); Thrane v. Metro. Transp. Auth., No. 15-cv-07418(FB)(LB), 2018 WL 840043 (E.D.N.Y. Feb.
12, 2018); Lin v. City of New York, No. 14 Civ. 9994 (PAE), 2016 WL 6962536 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 28,
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Illinois state court after the Illinois Supreme Court in 1993 adopted a rule
requiring good faith participation in court-annexed ADR.241 A flood of
litigation ensued concerning the parameters of good faith participation
and appropriate sanctions, with at least nineteen reported cases from the
Illinois Court of Appeals in the next five-and-one-half years addressing
these issues.242
When deciding whether to sanction a party for failing to act in good
faith at a settlement conference, the court is forced to delve into that
party’s motives for its actions.243 The parties will have to brief the issues,
which the court will have to review and perhaps hold a hearing to address.
The sanctioned party may file multiple motions concerning the sanctions
which the court will have to resolve, with the possibility of an appeal to
the district judge or circuit court.244 Further, parties may be tempted to file
tactically driven motions for sanctions.245 While ostensibly seeking
sanctions for bad faith participation, the moving party may primarily seek
to gain a litigation advantage over the other party or to bias the judge
against the other party.246 Rather than reducing court dockets, litigation
over the level of participation required at a settlement conference may
actually increase court congestion.247
While there can be advantages to settlement conferences in federal
court, there are also significant risks to both the parties and the court. As
discussed above, the primary concerns are explicit or implicit judicial
coercion of parties to settle the case, the loss of confidentiality that occurs
when parties litigate over good faith participation at a settlement
conference, and satellite litigation over good faith participation that may
2016); Chen v. Marvel Food Servs., LLC, No. CV 15-6206 (JMA) (AYS), 2016 WL 6872626
(E.D.N.Y. Nov. 21, 2016); Grenion v. Farmers Ins. Exch., No. CV 12-3219(JS)(GRB), 2014 WL
1284635 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 14, 2014); Day-Lewis v. United States EEOC, No. 12-2638, 2015 WL
221067 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 15, 2015); Perez v. Lantern Light Corp., No. C12-1406RSM, 2014 WL
4409466 (W.D. Wash. Sep. 8, 2014).
241. Lynch, supra note 1, at 200.
242. Id. at 200 & n.192.
243. Sherman, supra note 27, at 2093.
244. See, e.g., 2015 WL 3850103 (W.D. Ky. June 22, 2015) (Magistrate judge denies defendants’
motion to seal the settlement conference report and order); aff’d, 2015 WL 4776904 (W.D. Ky. Aug.
12, 2015) (affirming the imposition of sanctions on defendants by a district judge); Holly v. UPS
Supply Chain Sols., Inc., No. 3:13-cv-980-DJH-CHL, 2015 WL 2446110 (W.D. Ky. May 20, 2015)
(denying defendants’ motion to stay payment of sanctions while appeal is pending on behalf of a
magistrate judge); Koehn v. Tobias, No. 12 C 50321, 2016 WL 4436131 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 23, 2016),
aff’d, 866 F.3d 750 (7th Cir. 2017); Arneault v. O’Toole, No. 1:11-95, 2014 WL 1117900 (W.D. Pa.
Mar. 20, 2014), aff’d, 215 Fed. App’x 919 (3d Cir. 2017).
245. Brazil, Continuing the Conversation, supra note 5, at 33.
246. Id.
247. Dickey, supra note 42, at 757–58; Lynch, supra note 1, at 199; Sherman, supra note 27, at 2093.
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actually increase court dockets. The settlement conference process must
be fair for the parties to perceive that they have received justice.
V.

IMPROVING SETTLEMENT CONFERENCES

The final part of this Article suggests several changes to Rule 16 or to
local district court rules to improve settlement conferences in federal
court. Part V(A) draws primarily on new understandings of judicial
reasoning and decisionmaking to propose that Rule 16 should be amended
to provide that the trial judge may not hold settlement conferences in his
or her own cases. Part V(B) advocates for the adoption of an objective
standard for assessing good faith participation at a settlement conference.
Part V(C) addresses the procedural protections necessary to ensure that
settlement conferences are held in an appropriate manner.
A.

The Trial Judge Should Not Conduct the Settlement Conference

Rule 16 expressly permits judges to preside over settlement
conferences.248 A settlement conference may be held by one of the judges
assigned to the case (either the trial judge or the pretrial judge) or by a
judge who is not assigned to the case.249 In addition to concerns about
judicial coercion at settlement conferences, recent studies of
decisionmaking by judges raise several questions about whether a judge
assigned to the case should hold a settlement conference. First, judges
may have difficulty disregarding inadmissible information learned during
the settlement conference. Second, they may be improperly influenced by
their feelings about the litigants based on information learned during the
settlement conference. Third, some of the intuitive biases discussed above
may impact their decisionmaking after an unsuccessful settlement
conference.
1. The Difficulty of Deliberately Disregarding Inadmissible
Information
Psychological studies demonstrate that people have difficulty
disregarding information once they have learned it.250 Several reasons
may explain why. First, people may not agree that the information learned

248. FED. R. CIV. P. 16(a)(5), 16(c)(2)(I).
249. See supra notes 23–24.
250. Wistrich et al., Can Judges Ignore, supra note 151, at 1252–59.
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should be ignored and may not be motivated to ignore it.251 “Motivation
is critical to ignoring known information. People who do not agree that
the relevant information should be ignored are apt to rely on it when
making a decision.”252 Second, efforts to ignore thoughts about a subject
(“try not to think about a white bear”) might produce more thoughts about
the subject as people confirm that they are not thinking about it.253 Third,
through a process that psychologists call “mental contamination” or
“belief perseverance,” the new information changes how people think,
creating beliefs that may guide the integration and assessment of
subsequent information.254 Once people incorporate the new information,
they have great difficulty disregarding the beliefs that the information
inspired.255 As psychologist Daniel Gilbert explained, once people have
an experience they cannot set it aside and see the world as if the
experience had not happened.256 “Our experiences instantly become part
of the lens through which we view our entire past, present and future, and
like any lens, they shape and distort what we see . . . [o]nce we learn to
read, we can never again see letters as mere inky squiggles.”257
An empirical study by Andrew Wistrich and his co-authors confirms
that judges who learn inadmissible information are often unable to
disregard that information when making decisions later.258 The judges in
the study had difficulty disregarding information that they received in a
variety of contexts in both civil and criminal cases. For example, some
judges had trouble disregarding settlement demands made during a
settlement conference in a civil case, while other judges were improperly
influenced by information that the government had promised not to rely
upon at sentencing in a criminal case.259 This information influenced the
judges’ decisions even when they had ruled that the information was not
admissible.260 The authors conclude that the mental contamination or
belief perseverance that persists after judges learn inadmissible

251. Id. at 1260–62.
252. Id. at 1260.
253. Id. at 1262–64.
254. Id. at 1264–70.
255. Id.
256. DANIEL GILBERT, STUMBLING ON HAPPINESS 49 (2006).
257. Id.
258. Wistrich et al., Can Judges Ignore, supra note 151, at 1323–24.
259. Id. at 1286–312. The study did show that the judges were able to ignore the outcome of a
search when determining whether probable cause existed and inadmissible information obtained in
violation of a criminal defendant’s right to counsel. Id. at 1313–23.
260. Id. at 1297, 1302–03.
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information can operate outside conscious thought, that judges are
“unwittingly influenced” by inadmissible information, and that they are
unable to ignore it most of the time.261
While the Federal Rules of Evidence limit the evidence that a judge or
jury will hear at trial, those rules do not apply during a settlement
conference. During a settlement conference, a judge will have direct
personal contact with the litigants, their lawyers, and insurers. The judge
will likely discuss with the parties and counsel their analysis of any
pending or anticipated motions. The judge may learn that a defendant in
a tort lawsuit has taken subsequent remedial measures, information that
would not be admissible under most circumstances unless it meets one of
the exceptions set out in Federal Rule of Evidence 407.262 The judge will
learn the policy limits of any applicable insurance, counsel’s evaluation
of the strength and weaknesses of the case, and counsel’s view of its most
likely outcome. Because many judges conduct most or all of the
conference in separate sessions with each party, neither party knows
exactly what the judge discussed with the other party and consequently
cannot rebut any selective or one-sided information or argument the other
side provided.263 As the conference progresses and offers are exchanged,
the judge will likely develop an impression of each party’s cooperation in
the process and their strategies and priorities for resolution. The judge
may also be privy to the feelings of the parties, their motivations, and any
personal reasons that impact resolution of the case.264 Thus, a judge is
likely to be exposed to a great deal of inadmissible information during a
settlement conference and may have trouble disregarding it in later rulings
if the settlement conference is unsuccessful.
2.

The Emotional Influence of Settlement Conferences on Judges

A second danger is that a judge may be influenced by feelings about
the parties that are generated during the conference. A judge may be
exposed to a broad spectrum of emotions from the parties as the settlement
conference progresses. Studies show that an emotional response—like
sympathy or disgust toward a person—can occur rapidly and completely
determine a person’s judgment about an issue, precluding rational

261. Id. at 1323.
262. FED. R. EVID. 407.
263. Deason, supra note 16, at 125.
264. For example, in one settlement conference that I held, I learned late in the day that plaintiff’s
daughter, a crucial witness on damages, had joined the military, was being deployed to Japan, and
would not be available to testify at trial.
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deliberation.265 Psychologists use the term “affect heuristic” to refer to a
person’s wholesale reliance on an emotional response to make a
judgment.266 But even when people do not rely completely on an
emotional reaction, emotions can guide their judgment.267 Emotions can
affect people’s cognitive processing, guiding their perceptions of others,
and shaping their attitudes and beliefs about people and issues.268
Therefore, even deliberative reasoning can be influenced by a person’s
emotional reactions.269
A recent study of how judges reacted to both sympathetic and nonsympathetic parties in hypothetical cases demonstrates that judges’
moods, emotions, and reactions to parties can influence their judgment.270
In one of the studies, the judges were asked to decide whether a debtor
would be allowed to discharge credit card debt under Chapter Seven of
the Bankruptcy Code.271 Half of the judges read a version of the case in
which the debtor had incurred the debt during a spring break trip to
Florida, while the other half were told that the debtor had incurred the debt
during a visit to her mother in Florida who had cancer and needed
assistance with her medication.272 While the reason for the debt was not
relevant, the judges in the latter group apparently allowed their sympathy
for the debtor to influence their decisions: 52% of the judges who
reviewed the “sick mother” version discharged the debt, compared to 32%
of the judges who reviewed the “spring break” version.273 In another
study, judges were asked to dismiss charges of possession of marijuana
because the defendant obtained a medical marijuana registration card
from his physician after his arrest.274 Half of the judges were informed
that the defendant was being treated for occasional mild seizures, was
nineteen years old, unemployed, on probation for beating an ex-girlfriend,
and had a juvenile record for drug possession and drug dealing.275 The

265. Andrew J. Wistrich, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Chris Guthrie, Heart Versus Head: Do Judges
Follow the Law or Follow Their Feelings?, 93 TEX. L. REV. 855, 866 (2015) [hereinafter Wistrich et
al., Heart Versus Head].
266. Id.
267. Id. at 869; KAHNEMAN, supra note 67, at 346–47.
268. KAHNEMAN, supra note 67, at 346–47; ROBBENNOLT & STERNLIGHT, supra note 54, at 285.
269. Wistrich et al., Heart Versus Head, supra note 265, at 869.
270. Id. at 862, 874–98.
271. Id. at 887.
272. Id. at 888.
273. Id. at 888–89.
274. Id. at 880–81.
275. Id. at 881.
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other half of the judges were told that the defendant was being treated for
cancer, was fifty-five years old, married with three children, employed as
an accountant, and had no criminal record.276 As in the credit card debt
scenario, the judges were more lenient with the more sympathetic
defendant: 84% of the judges dismissed the charges against the fifty-fiveyear-old defendant, while only 54% of the judges dismissed the charges
against the nineteen-year-old defendant.277
After reviewing all the studies, the authors found that they
demonstrated “clear evidence that emotions influence judges.”278 The
results showed that the judges consistently favored the litigant who
generated the more sympathetic response.279 And the judges’ favoritism
extended beyond simply finding the facts of the case: the study
demonstrates that emotion influences how judges interpret and apply the
law “even in the relatively emotionally arid (compared to trial) setting of
pretrial motions.”280 The authors conclude that judges react in much the
same way that other people do and that motivated cognition explains how,
without consciously being aware of it, judges covertly lean toward the
more likable or sympathetic party, resulting in that party prevailing more
often than the less sympathetic party on seemingly objective and
legitimate grounds.281
3.

The Impact of Intuitive Biases Formed at Settlement Conference

Finally, some of the intuitive biases previously discussed may
unconsciously impact a judge’s rulings after the settlement conference.
Anchoring can exert a powerful effect on judgment and may influence
judges’ civil damage awards.282 Even if the judge does not suggest that
the parties settle for a certain amount or on particular terms, the judge will
likely form an initial opinion of the case based on the evidence presented
at the settlement conference.283 This could trigger confirmation bias,
where the judge might unconsciously seek additional information that
confirms the judge’s initial opinion, and biased assimilation, where the
276. Id.
277. Id. at 882.
278. Id. at 898.
279. Id. at 898–99.
280. Id. at 899.
281. Id. Psychologists use the term “motivated cognition” to explain the tendency for people to
seek consistency between their deliberative judgment and their emotional reaction to a person or issue.
Id. at 869.
282. See supra Part II(B).
283. Brazil, Hosting Mediations, supra note 40, at 262.
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judge may assess evidence by the extent to which it is consistent with that
initial opinion.284 Judges are also subject to the hindsight bias, which
generally benefits tort plaintiffs because the bias makes it seem as if the
defendant had a greater ability to predict what occurred than was actually
true.285 Judges often tend to undervalue statistical information when
assessing liability (the representativeness bias).286 Further, exposure to the
parties and the issues at a settlement conference could affect judges’
demeanor during trial, reflecting their opinion about the proper trial
outcome, thereby influencing the jurors.287
Given all of these issues that arise when a judge conducts a settlement
conference, Rule 16 should be amended to prohibit trial judges from
holding settlement conferences in their cases, and pretrial judges should
not rule on dispositive motions after an unsuccessful settlement
conference.288 While it may be possible in larger judicial districts with
many judges to have a judge not assigned to the case hold the settlement
conference, that might not be feasible in smaller judicial districts.289 In
most instances there is less danger when the pretrial judge conducts the
settlement conference. The pretrial judge generally does not rule upon
dispositive motions but instead addresses scheduling deadlines, discovery
motions, and other preliminary matters.290 In some cases the settlement
conference is held after discovery has been completed and pretrial
motions are resolved. In other cases, counsel are professional and
cooperative during discovery, and there are no significant motions for the
pretrial judge to address. In yet other cases, both sides bargain

284. Deason, supra note 16, at 113, 124–25.
285. Guthrie et al., Inside, supra note 77, at 828.
286. Guthrie et al., Blinking, supra note 69, at 22–24.
287. Deason, supra note 16, at 142; Killefer, supra note 50, at 17; Wissler, supra note 31, at 312.
288. Some commentators have argued that neither the trial judge nor the pretrial judge should
conduct settlement conferences, while others have concluded that only the trial judge should be
precluded from doing so. Compare Deason, supra note 16, at 139–40, and Wissler, supra note 31, at
302–14, with Wistrich et al., Can Judges Ignore, supra note 151, at 1325–26, Killefer, supra note 50,
at 21–22, and Cratsley, supra note 34, at 571.
289. For example, the District of North Dakota has two magistrate judges located in Bismarck and
one located in Fargo, while the District of South Dakota has magistrate judges located in Sioux Falls,
Rapid City, Pierre and Aberdeen. See, e.g., Magistrate Judge Clare R. Hochhalter, U.S. DISTRICT
COURT OF N.D., http://www.ndd.uscourts.gov/Judge/JHochhalter [https://perma.cc/G9F5-7YER];
Magistrate Judge Charles S. Miller, Jr., U.S. DISTRICT COURT OF N.D.,
www.ndd.uscourts.gov/Judge/JMiller [https://perma.cc/HQL2-3NU6]; Magistrate Judge Alice R.
Senechal,
U.S.
DISTRICT
COURT
N.D.,
www.ndd.uscourts.gov/Judge/JSenechal
[https://perma.cc/KV8X-43DN]; District of South Dakota Court Info, U.S. DISTRICT COURT OF S.D.,
www.sdd.uscourts.gov/court-info [https://perma.cc/9A9E-FVDJ].
290. FED. R. CIV. P. 72(a); Deason, supra note 16, at 111.
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cooperatively during the settlement conference but are unable to reach an
agreement because of a good faith dispute about the law or how the jury
will view the facts of the case. If a pretrial judge believes that he or she
has learned information during the settlement conference that may
compromise the judge’s ability to rule on pretrial motions, the judge can
recuse from the case. Given the studies of judicial reasoning and
decisionmaking, I agree that the pretrial judge should not rule on
dispositive motions after holding an unsuccessful settlement
conference.291
B.

Good Faith Participation: An Objective Standard

To ensure that parties do not feel coerced into settling their case and to
reduce the likelihood of satellite litigation, courts should adopt an
objective standard for assessing whether a party participated in good faith
at a settlement conference.292 Sanctions are appropriate if a party violates
a rule or order specifying objectively determinable conduct.293 For
example, in the District of Hawaii, sanctions may be imposed if a party,
lawyer, or authorized representative fails to attend the settlement
conference or fails to submit a position paper prior to the settlement
conference.294 Sanctions may also be imposed if a party violates an order
that directs the parties to notify the court before the settlement conference
if the party is not prepared to negotiate at the settlement conference.295
Courts must resist the temptation to award sanctions based on a
subjective evaluation of good faith participation. Subjective behaviors
include failing to bargain sufficiently, failing to make a reasonable offer,
and failing to have a representative present at the settlement conference
with “sufficient settlement authority.”296 Even the proponents of a “good
faith participation” standard admit the phrase is ambiguous, and
ambiguity about the level of participation required at the conference does
291. See, e.g., Blackmon v. Eaton Corp., 587 Fed. App’x 925, 933–34 (6th Cir. 2014) (concluding
that a magistrate judge who conducted an unsuccessful settlement conference was not disqualified
from issuing a report and recommendation on a motion for summary judgment without addressing
any recent studies on judicial decisionmaking).
292. ABA, GOOD FAITH REQUIREMENTS, supra note 41, at 2; Thompson, supra note 38, at 377;
Dickey, supra note 42, at 767.
293. ABA, GOOD FAITH REQUIREMENTS, supra note 41, at 2; Thompson, supra note 38, at 377;
Dickey, supra note 42, at 767.
294. D. HAW. L.R. 16.5(b)(3); see also Alvarez v. GEICO Ins. Agency, No. 15-cv-0198 MV/SCY,
2016 WL 7173811, at *2–3 (D.N.M. Feb. 29, 2016) (imposing sanctions for failing to timely submit
a position paper).
295. See infra Part V.C.
296. ABA, GOOD FAITH REQUIREMENTS, supra note 41, at 2.
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not provide the parties with a clear understanding of what they must do to
comply.297 Assessing sanctions for bad faith participation will also require
the court to make complex evaluations of the parties’ substantive
bargaining positions at the settlement conference, including examining
their motives.298
Kimberlee Kovach believes that good faith relates to the manner of
participation at the conference, and that the substance of the negotiations
(the specific offers and counteroffers) should not be admissible in
proceedings for sanctions: the “economic aspects of the negotiations—the
offers and responses, in and of themselves—may not create a bad faith
claim.”299 The Western District of Pennsylvania’s ADR rules state that
“[i]n good faith negotiations, neither party is required to make a
concession or agree to any proposal, nor are they precluded from seeking
the best possible resolution for their own interests.”300 Similarly, the
Committee Notes to section 4.3.1 of the Ethical Guidelines for Settlement
Negotiations promulgated by the ABA Section of Litigation state: “[i]t is
not bad faith for a party to refuse to engage in settlement discussions or to
refuse to settle. Settlement is not an obligation, but an alternative to
litigation.”301
The participants at a settlement conference may have different interests
and perspectives about settlement. And, as discussed above, they are all
subject to intuitive biases that may produce errors when attempting to
resolve a case at a settlement conference.302 It can be “extremely difficult”
to evaluate subjective claims of bad faith and distinguish good faith from
bad faith participation at a settlement conference.303 A party should not
have to surrender its honest evaluation of the case to avoid the imposition
of sanctions based on a court’s subjective evaluation of whether the party
participated in good faith at the settlement conference.
Courts should also refrain from requiring parties to attend a settlement
conference with “sufficient settlement authority.” While some courts fail
to define this term, others define it to mean that the party must have

297. Thompson, supra note 38, at 374; Brazil, Continuing the Conversation, supra note 5, at 31–
32; Kovach, Good Faith, supra note 43, at 600.
298. Thompson, supra note 38, at 375; Sherman, supra note 27, at 2093.
299. Kovach, Good Faith, supra note 43, at 603.
300. W.D. PA. ALT. DISPUTE RESOLUTION POLICIES AND PROCEDURES § 2.8 (2018).
301. ETHICAL GUIDELINES FOR SETTLEMENT NEGOTIATIONS, ABA SECTION OF LITIG. § 4.3.1
committee note to 2002 amendment (Aug. 2002).
302. See supra Part II(B).
303. Tuscola Wind III, LLC v. Almer Charter Twp., No. 17-cv-10497, 2018 WL 1250476, at *10 (E.D.
Mich. Mar. 12, 2018); see also Exec. Wings, Inc. v. Dolby, 131 F. Supp. 3d 404, 421 n.24 (W.D. Pa. 2015).
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complete and unfettered authority to meet or pay the opposing party’s last
demand without consulting with anyone else.304 Requiring a party (usually
a defendant) to appear with “full settlement authority” ignores the reality
of pretrial bargaining. Settlement conferences are not held in a vacuum;
they are part of a larger negotiation process by which the parties try to
resolve the case.305 The process generally includes informal discussions
between counsel involving initial offers and counteroffers that are often
extreme.306 As Richard Birke and Craig Fox stated, “[w]e consider it
unfortunate that ‘starting reasonably’ appears to be an ineffective
negotiation strategy.”307 Negotiators may make “take it or leave it” offers,
offer proposals that are extreme and predictably unacceptable, or fail to
respond meaningfully to the offers of the other side.308 Parties often
bargain strategically, disguising their true intentions, desires, or chances
of winning in order to obtain an advantage in settlement negotiations.309
Traditional litigation behaviors include pressing arguments known to be
specious, concealing significant information, obscuring weaknesses,
attempting to divert attention away from the main analytical or evidentiary
matter, misleading others, and remaining rigidly attached to positions not
sincerely held.310 Parties may begin bargaining at a conference using an
adversarial/competitive approach and may posture and make few
concessions until the settlement conference is almost over.311 At that
point, they may switch to a more cooperative/accommodating approach
304. See, e.g., MD. LOCAL R. 607(3) (demonstrating an example where a court provided no
definition); Bakken Waste, LLC v. Great Am. Ins. Co. of New York, No. 15-cv-00303-CMA-MEH,
2015 WL 4036191, at *1 (D. Colo. June 30, 2015) (holding that “full authority” means the
representative possesses the complete and unfettered capacity to settle the case). Courts that do not
define the term create additional uncertainty for the parties, because a party who believes that the
other party’s claim is totally without merit may view “full settlement authority” quite differently than
the other party.
305. Sherman, supra note 27, at 2083 (“ADR . . . is ‘fundamentally a process of assisted
negotiation.’ The extensive literature on negotiation theory and strategy is central to ADR practice,
reflecting the degree to which negotiation underlies ADR.” (citation omitted)).
306. Kothe v. Smith, 771 F.2d 667, 669 (2d Cir. 1985); ROBBENNOLT & STERNLIGHT, supra note
54, at 265–66 (“[E]xtreme demands and offers are just starting points in most negotiations.”); Galanter
& Cahill, supra note 6, at 1371.
307. Birke & Fox, supra note 52, at 41 n.170.
308. Birke & Fox, supra note 52, at 40; Schneider, supra note 83, at 165; Sherman, supra note 27, at 2092–93.
309. Brazil, Continuing the Conversation, supra note 5, at 29; Gross & Syverud, Don’t Try, supra
note 7, at 52; Gross & Syverud, Getting to No, supra note 10, at 328; Sherman, supra note 27, at 2097
n.81.
310. Brazil, Hosting Mediations, supra note 40, at 239–40; Brazil, Mediator as Medium, supra note
167, at 23 (discussing how gaming the mediator “can include actively misleading the mediator (by
lying or otherwise) about anything that might be a factor in the negotiation dynamics”).
311. Baumeister et al., supra note 88, at 399–400; Dickey, supra note 42, at 767.
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and make concessions to attempt to reach a deal just before the settlement
conference concludes.312
Courts have overlooked these basic principles of negotiation theory and
practice when they sanction a party for failing to appear with “full
settlement authority” at a settlement conference. One example should
suffice. In a civil rights case involving claims for excessive force and
failure to intervene against several police officers, the defendants initially
offered $47,500 in settlement and later increased the offer to $200,000.313
In response, the plaintiff demanded $3.6 million and an admission of
liability.314 Had the defendants been ordered to appear at a settlement
conference with “full settlement authority” before trial, they would have
had to obtain authority of $3.6 million to comply with the order. A jury
subsequently awarded the plaintiff $32,092 in damages.315 When
evaluating plaintiff’s post-trial motion for attorney’s fees, the court stated
that the case was a “textbook example” of a plaintiff aiming unreasonably
high, that the defendants more realistically evaluated the case, and that the
case “never was more than a low end five-figure case and never merited a
seven-figure settlement demand.”316 Rather than requiring a party to
appear with “full settlement authority,” the court should require that a
party or party’s representative hold a position with the party or insurer that
allows him or her to speak definitively and commit the party to a particular
position in the litigation.317 As the Seventh Circuit recognized, a party’s
representative need not “come to court willing to settle on someone else’s
terms,” but need only “come to court in order to consider the possibility
of settlement.”318 Adopting an objective standard for assessing good faith
participation will help ensure that the parties receive procedural justice,
do not feel coerced into settling at the settlement conference, and reduce
the likelihood of time-consuming litigation over this issue.
C.

Procedural Safeguards

Each judicial district’s local ADR rules should contain substantive and
procedural safeguards to ensure that a settlement conference is not used
312. Baumeister et al., supra note 88, at 401, 404; Dickey, supra note 42, at 767.
313. Capps v. Drake, No. 3:14-cv-441-NJR-DGW, 2017 WL 1178263, at *5 (S.D. Ill. Mar. 30,
2017). The trial court denied the plaintiff’s request for attorney’s fees for a variety of reasons. Id. at
*2. The Seventh Circuit reversed the denial of attorney’s fees because plaintiff’s recovery was more
than “de minimis.” Capps v. Drake, 894 F.3d 802, 804–06 (7th Cir. 2018) (italics omitted).
314. Capps v. Drake, 2017 WL 1178263, at *5.
315. Id.
316. Id. at *6.
317. G. Heileman Brewing Co. v. Joseph Oat Corp., 871 F.2d 648, 653 (7th Cir. 1989).
318. Id.

14 - Lynch (2).docx (Do Not Delete)

2019]

IMPROVING SETTLEMENT CONFERENCES

10/21/2019 5:02 PM

1277

improperly and that the parties understand clearly what they must do to
comply with the court’s expectations at the conference. They must also
protect the confidentiality of the process.
First, the rules should inform the parties that they must notify the court
if the party is not prepared to or does not intend to negotiate at the
settlement conference. Courts should recognize that there are many
reasons why a party might not be interested in negotiating at a settlement
conference. Plaintiffs may refuse to accept less than the defendant’s
insurance policy limits in a case involving wrongful death or serious
personal injury because of the extent of the damages or because of a
potential bad faith claim, while defendants may refuse to make an offer if
they believe they are not liable.319 In addition, both sides may wish “to
establish favorable legal precedent, send signals of resolve to other
potential adversaries, [or] secure the procedural protections and public
visibility that trials afford.”320 If the parties do not wish to discuss
settlement, they should be allowed to request to be excluded or to opt-out
of participation in the settlement conference.321
Federal courts have heavy caseloads, and judges and other parties do
not want to waste time if a party is not interested in discussing
settlement.322 Courts may wish to consider adopting a rule similar to one
found in the Western District of Pennsylvania’s ADR rules, which
requires a party to explicitly inform the neutral and the other parties no
later than ten calendar days prior to the mediation session if (1) the party
does not intend to make a demand or settlement offer, or (2) the party
intends to wait until the disposition of certain motions to engage in
settlement discussions.323
Second, the parties or their representatives and their attorneys should
be required to attend the settlement conference and be prepared to state
their positions on the issues presented in the case.324 When a party is fully
319. See, e.g., Griego v. Douglas, 264 F. Supp. 3d 1109, 1110–11 (D.N.M. 2017).
320. Don Peters, Just Say No: Minimizing Limited Authority Negotiating in Court-Mandated
Mediation, 8 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 273, 276 (2008); Rachlinski, supra note 5655, at 122; Gross &
Syverud, Don’t Try, supra note 7, at 52–57.
321. Thompson, supra note 38, at 424. If the court orders the parties to attend a settlement
conference when they have stated that they do not wish to attend, the court should not find bad faith
participation if the parties fail to bargain at the conference.
322. Id. at 417.
323. W.D. PA. ALT. DISPUTE RESOLUTION POLICIES AND PROCEDURES § 2.8 (2018).
324. Lynch, supra note 1, at 202–03; Sherman, supra note 27, at 2094–96. Given advances in
technology, courts may consider allowing parties or insurance company representatives to participate
by telephone or video conference. The District of Hawaii allows parties to be present in person or by
telephone at a settlement conference. D. HAW. L.R. 16.5(b)(2). See also Thomas J. Stipanowich,
Living the Dream of ADR: Reflections on Four Decades of the Quiet Revolution in Dispute
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insured and the insurer has assumed that party’s defense, there may be
little reason to have the party present because the insurer will usually have
sole authority over defense of the claim, including whether to settle the
claim or go to trial.325 Therefore, an adjuster or other representative may
be the appropriate party to attend the hearing.326 In some cases it is not
necessary or even helpful to have certain defendants present. For example,
in civil rights cases involving claims for excessive force or sexual
discrimination, it can be detrimental to the process if the individual
defendant is present, and the parties often agree that another defense
representative and an individual with settlement authority should
attend.327 But if a party and the party’s insurer have differing opinions
about the case, or a party has a reasonable exposure to a recovery above
his or her insurance policy limits, the party should be required to attend
the settlement conference.328
Third, courts should provide for confidentiality of the information
discussed at the settlement conference. This will allow parties to raise
sensitive issues with the judge, contribute to the free flow of information
between the parties that makes a settlement conference more likely to be
productive, protect the neutrality of the settlement conference judge, and
help ensure that the parties perceive that the settlement conference process
is procedurally fair.329 Because the federal district courts have a wide
variety of inconsistent rules on confidentiality, Rule 16 should be
amended to provide that communications during a settlement conference
shall not be disclosed in a motion seeking sanctions under Rule 16.330
Because it is a lengthy process to amend the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, in the interim courts should amend their local rules to provide
such confidentiality.
Fourth, to ensure that an economically more powerful party does not
use a settlement conference to gain leverage over another party, the court
should set reasonable limits on the length of the settlement conference and
the number of sessions mandated.331 Similarly, the court should not order
Resolution, 18 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 513, 543–44 (2017); Rack, supra note 95, at 442–43.
325. Lynch, supra note 1, at 203.
326. Id.
327. Griego v. Douglas, 264 F. Supp. 3d 1109, 1113 (D.N.M. 2017).
328. Id.; Gross & Syverud, Don’t Try, supra note 7, at 53–54; Sherman, supra note 27, at 2105;
Email from Beth German to William Lynch (Oct. 31, 2018, 03:03 PM) (on file with author).
329. See supra Part IV(B).
330. Deason, supra note 16, at 141; Dickey, supra note 42, at 765.
331. In re Atl. Pipe, 304 F.3d 135, 146–47 (1st Cir. 2002); Brazil, Continuing the Conversation,
supra note 5, at 16, 31–32.
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the parties into multiple settlement conferences to attempt to force a
settlement.332
A final procedural issue concerns the timing of the settlement
conference.333 The parties usually need time to conduct some initial
discovery and perhaps file any critical motions before they are ready to
consider settlement of the case.334 Cases that settle before the litigants
have adequate information about the case might “send inaccurate signals
to the parties and to society about what conduct is permitted and what the
consequences of impermissible conduct will be.”335 On the other hand,
settling too late increases the costs for the parties and the court system,
may provide a strategic advantage to a wealthy defendant, delays
compensating victims, and potentially diminishes the deterrence of
wrongdoers.336 The judge should broach the idea of settlement early in the
case to try to select the appropriate time for the settlement conference.
The adoption of these procedural safeguards will help ensure that the
parties believe that the settlement conference process is a fair procedure
in which they freely and fully express their positions, discuss the issues
with a neutral decisionmaker, and consider resolution of the case without
being pressured to do so.
CONCLUSION
Settlement conferences are an important part of the ADR processes
offered in federal court. A settlement conference conducted by a judge
can have numerous advantages. But judges who conduct settlement
conferences should be aware of recent studies of decisionmaking and
negotiation that explain how each participant at a settlement conference
will bring a different perspective and outlook to the conference and how
each is subject to factors such as intuitive biases that could interfere with
settlement of the case.
Judges can get caught up in “their zeal to settle cases.” 337 Because a
332. See, e.g., HTK Hawaii, Inc. v. Sun, No. 15-00114 JMS-RLP, 2016 WL 6917284, at *1 (D.
Haw. May 12, 2016) (denying motion for sanctions when trial court ordered two settlement
conferences and then a mandatory mediation in what it admitted was not “a big case.”).
333. Miller, supra note 50, at 32 (“We have to be sensitive to the different dynamics of each case
and that each case has its own optimal time for settlement . . . [s]o if we push too hard at the wrong
time, it’s simply not going to work . . . .”).
334. Galanter & Cahill, supra note 6, at 1369–70; Killefer, supra note 50, at 21; Miller, supra note
50, at 31.
335. Wistrich & Rachlinski, Lawyers’ Intuitions, supra note 102, at 573–74.
336. Id. at 574–75.
337. G. Heileman Brewing Co. v. Joseph Oat Corp., 871 F.2d 648, 657 (7th Cir. 1989) (Posner, J., dissenting).

14 - Lynch (2).docx (Do Not Delete)

10/21/2019 5:02 PM

1280

[Vol. 94:1233

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

settlement conference is conducted by a judge, there is the potential that a
party will feel coerced, either explicitly or implicitly, to settle the case at
the conference to avoid unfavorable rulings as a punishment for failing to
settle. This potential is exacerbated by Rule 16’s ambiguous good faith
participation requirement. Another danger is that confidentiality, which is
considered essential to the integrity of a settlement conference, will be
compromised when a party raises claims of bad faith participation at the
conference. And satellite litigation over whether a party participated in
good faith has increased significantly and undercuts the premise that
settlement conferences help reduce court dockets.
As reported in 1994, the vast majority of cases settle before trial.338
Perhaps because of the federal court’s incorporation of ADR into the court
system, even fewer cases reach trial now. Because a settlement conference
may substitute for a party’s “day in court,” settlement conferences should
be of high quality, providing parties with procedural fairness so that they
perceive that the settlement conference process is fair and that they were
not coerced into settling their case. To ensure that the parties receive both
procedural and substantive justice in attempting to resolve their cases, this
Article suggests several improvements to the current settlement
conference process. First, Rule 16 should be amended to provide that the
trial judge may not hold a settlement conference, and the pretrial judge
should not rule on dispositive motions after holding an unsuccessful
settlement conference. Second, courts should adopt an objective standard
for assessing good faith participation and should not award sanctions for
failing to bargain sufficiently at a settlement conference or failing to have
a representative present with full settlement authority. These changes
would reduce satellite litigation over the parameters of good faith
participation and appropriate sanctions. Third, other procedural
safeguards, including those allowing parties to opt-out of a settlement
conference and protecting the confidentiality of settlement conference
communications, should be adopted to ensure that the parties feel they
have been treated fairly when attempting to resolve their case at a
settlement conference.

338. Galanter & Cahill, supra note 6, at 1342.

